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ABSTRACT 
 
Transnational Arms Flows in the Syrian Civil War 
 
by 
 
Megan Malina Stanek 
 
This paper looks at small arms transfers to non-state actors in the Syrian conflict as 
an under analyzed aspect of intervention in intrastate war that is both globalized and 
potentially destabilizing. I challenge the dominant narrative that the international community 
has failed to intervene in Syria, by pointing to the manifold government-funded arms 
transfers to opposition groups beginning in 2012. I find that there are two significant 
networks of arms trafficking: one through Jordan with Saudi Arabian and American support; 
the other through Turkey with Qatari support. These patterns and rivalries between donor 
countries have contributed to three processes within the transformation from revolution to 
civil war: militarization, increased sectarianism, and fragmentation of the opposition. I 
review two mechanisms of international arms control: multilateral embargoes and the recent 
Arms Trade Treaty. Their weaknesses, as evident in the case of Syria, are related to the 
problems of self-monitoring and enforcement by states that have contradictory incentives. 
Next, I address the related issue of surplus arms by looking at how the failure of 
disarmament measures in Iraq and Libya had a direct impact on arms proliferation in Syria. I 
conclude with a discussion of the legality of arms transfers to non-state actors and the need 
to focus on political rather than military solutions to globalized conflict.  
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Introduction 
It has been clear since at least 2012 that the violence in Syria has evolved beyond the 
dynamics of a domestic revolt. Some have suggested a proxy war between Saudi Arabia and 
Iran, but the reality of the conflict shows a much more complicated picture. There are more 
than two external powers vying for influence over the situation, and the goals of each are far 
from clear.  
One demonstration of the regionalization of the conflict is the number of countries that 
participated in the Geneva II Conference on Syria in January 2014. The meeting was the 
second attempt to bring about a political solution between the regime of Bashar al-Assad 
and the political opposition, after the first conference in June 2012. Representatives from at 
least 26 countries were invited to the 2014 forum, half of which do not belong to the 
immediate region or the Arab community.1 
Another sign of the international nature of the conflict is the Friends of Syria group, 
which might be more aptly named “Countries with Vital Strategic Interests in Syria”. The 
Friends of Syria meetings represented an effort to bypass the UN Security Council after 
Russia vetoed a resolution condemning the actions of President Assad, and to recognize the 
Syrian National Council as representing the Syrian people. The group has met several times 
beginning in February 2012, and has been attended by up to 114 states. As of 2014 a core 
group of 11 states has emerged, representing regional supporters of the opposition along 
with a handful of European countries and the United States.2 
                                                
1 “List of Geneva II participant countries determined,” Anadolu Agency, December 20, 2013, accessed 
January 9, 2015, http://www.aa.com.tr/en/news/265260--geneva-ii-participant-list-finalized-un-special-envoy-
brahimi-says 
 
2 “Friends of Syria Deliver Nothing New,” Al-Monitor, April 2014, accessed January 9, 2015, 
http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/04/syrian-opposition-radical-elements-wester-arms.html 
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The international community is deeply involved in Syria, and yet the dominant narrative 
about the conflict in Western media is one of the ‘failure to intervene’. Human rights 
organizations diligently document the atrocities of the Assad regime and deplore the UN 
Security Council for its inaction. A headline on the blog of the International Coalition for 
the Responsibility to Protect reads, “UN Security Council fails to uphold its Responsibility 
to Protect in Syria”.3  Susan Rice proclaimed, "The council's inaction on Syria is a moral and 
strategic disgrace that history will judge harshly" (U.S. Mission to the United Nations, 
2013). This narrative leaves almost no room to disagree without being called an ‘Assad 
apologist’, but it completely ignores the less visible international intervention happening on 
the ground through arms transfers, shadow governments and non-state actors. 
The intervention that mainstream media and governments debate refers primarily to 
military action through aerial bombardment and no-fly zones. A CNN poll from 2012 asking 
how Americans felt about intervention in Syria found that most didn’t think the U.S. had 
responsibility to take any action in Syria.4 ‘Taking action’ was not defined in the poll, but 
the only specific tactic mentioned was a no-fly zone. In 2014 another poll showed that 
public opinion had shifted, and that most Americans now approved of intervention in Syria, 
this time in the form of airstrikes.5 
                                                
3 “UN Security Council fails to uphold its Responsibility to Protect in Syria,” International Coalition for 
the Responsibility to Protect, Accessed March 1, 2015, 
http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/component/content/article/136-latest-news/3688-un- 
security-council-fails-to-uphold-its-responsibility-to-protect-in-syria 
 
4 “CNN Poll: Majority of Americans oppose US intervention in Syria,” CNN, June 7, 2012, accessed May 
3, 2015. http://politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com/2012/06/07/cnn-poll-majority-of-americans-oppose-us-
intervention-in-syria/ 
 
5 Balz, Dan and Craighill, Peyton. “Poll: Public supports strikes in Iraq, Syria; Obama’s ratings hover near 
his all-time lows,” The Washington Post, September 9, 2014, accessed May 19, 2014, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/poll-public-supports-strikes-in-iraq-syria-obamas-ratings-hover-near-
his-all-time-lows/2014/09/08/69c164d8-3789-11e4-8601-97ba88884ffd_story.html 
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Scholars have begun to contrast the use of a no-fly zone and airstrikes in Libya in 2011 
with the inaction in Syria. Although the overall outcome of the NATO intervention in Libya 
is seen by many as a disaster, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973 continues to 
be viewed as a success for international humanitarian intervention and for the emerging 
Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) norm. “Hopefully, Libya was not an aberration. Syria 
currently shames the collective international conscience and appears to dash the hopes for 
decisive outside military intervention” (Weiss 2014, 36). Katherine Kersavage writes that 
Libya “has prompted comparisons and contrasts to the situation in Syria, where over 
100,000 people have died but where military intervention has not been pursued” (Kersavage 
2014, 23).  
While rightly acknowledging that the crisis in Syria reflects the continuing primacy of 
geopolitics over principle (Hehir 2013; Weiss 2014), these types of assessments miss one 
critical point. Airstrikes and no-fly zones are not the only forms of intervention. As an 
international community we have failed the people of Syria through collective inaction, but 
also through deliberate individual actions that have contributed to further violence and 
destabilization of the region as a whole. It’s true that after four years of destruction, inaction 
has left Syria without a political resolution, adequate amounts of humanitarian aid, or 
support for millions of refugees. What is not so frequently discussed is the external 
intervention through transfers of small arms and light weapons (SALW) that has 
transformed the conflict and will continue to have repercussions for years down the road. 
The revolution that started in 2011 as a series of nonviolent protests quickly turned into an 
intractable violent confrontation fueled by sectarian rhetoric and increasingly supported by 
foreign powers. 
  4 
One prominent Syrian activist and blogger, who goes by the pseudonym Edward E. 
Dark, has written eloquently about the moment he felt the revolution was lost. It was not the 
failure of the international community to intervene, but the taking up of arms by factions of 
the opposition, aided by external actors. He writes: 
“To us, a rebel fighting against tyranny doesn’t commit the same sort of crimes as 
the regime he’s supposed to be fighting against. He doesn’t loot the homes, businesses 
and communities of the people he’s supposed to be fighting for. Yet, as the weeks went 
by in Aleppo, it became increasingly clear that this was exactly what was happening. 
...For “us,” a revolution was a slow, deliberate and committed struggle for change. 
Like water drops repeatedly beating down on a boulder, eventually we would break it. 
But for “them,” well, their idea of change was throwing a ton of TNT at that boulder and 
having it, and everything around it, blown to smithereens. 
...It was around about that time that I gave up on the revolution, such as it had 
become, and saw that the only way to Syria’s salvation was through reconciliation and a 
renunciation of violence. Many felt this way, too. Unfortunately, that is not a view 
shared by the warmongers and power brokers who still think that more Syrian blood 
should be spilled to appease the insatiable appetites of their sordid aspirations.”6 
For him and many others still living in Syria, violence is the problem, not the solution. 
Others display a more vengeful attitude, specifically directed toward non-Syrians who have 
become involved in the conflict. What would elicit that kind of reaction? Since the 
beginning of the uprising, SALW have been crossing the border into Syria from all 
directions. State and privately funded arms making their way to both sides of the conflict 
reflect national and ideological priorities, not the humanitarian principles so often 
                                                
6 Dark, Edward, “How We Lost the Syrian Revolution”, Al-Monitor, May 2013, accessed May 19, 2015, 
http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/05/syria-revolution-aleppo-assad.html#ixzz3aMxR03QY 
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promulgated in defense of larger interventions. Rivalries, profit and strategic goals are 
among the drivers of these arms flows, but the consequences are much more complex. As I 
will show, the influx of weapons contributed to militarization of the revolutionary uprising 
and increasing sectarianism, making a political solution more difficult and less likely. As 
described by a journalist living in Damascus, “Syria's southern region is awash with heavy 
weaponry and dozens of rebel groups that are not neatly divided along tribal lines, creating 
an elaborate web of loyalties. While tribal conventions remain strong, they compete with 
intensified religious sensibilities, myriad political pressures and armed factions that want to 
obey their own rules.”7 
The demand for weapons in a conflict zone is high, and black market trafficking 
networks thrive in that environment. “War provides legitimation for various criminal forms 
of private aggrandizement while at the same time these are necessary sources of revenue in 
order to sustain the war” (Kaldor 2013, 117). Militants support themselves through looting, 
hostage-taking, illegal trade and external assistance in many forms.  
 But the war economy described by Kaldor is only half the picture. In this ungoverned 
shadow space where the licit and illicit arms trade meld together, traditional state actors 
would rather not make their presence known. Many governments involved in these arms 
transfers maintain an attitude of denial. Even when providing arms to an opposition group is 
officially announced, the policy is frequently framed not as military action or intervention, 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
7 Maayeh, Suha and Sands, Phil. “ Blinded by feuds, Syria’s southern rebels turn guns on one another”, 
The National, November 15, 2014, accessed May 19, 2015. 
http://www.thenational.ae/world/syria/20141115/blinded-by-feuds-syrias-southern-rebels-turn-guns-on-one-
another#full 
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but “aid”.8  
 Derek Gregory provides an interesting way of looking at the dichotomy between 
wars of the global North and wars of the South. He categorizes the wars of the North as 
“Revolutions in Military Affairs” that are “construed as humane wars because they are 
fought within the space of the modern – the space of Reason, Science and Law” (Gregory 
2010, 170). They emphasize specialized forces and new precision warfare. Meanwhile, the 
term “new war” is framed as inferior and messy, relying on non-state militias and 
concentrating violence on civilians. While the first type of war is considered virtuous, the 
second is criminalized, inviting intervention by the North.  
Using this framework, the global North only considers itself a participant in the virtuous 
type of war, and keeps its distance from the ‘dirty’, criminal aspects of war such as arms 
trafficking. Though it may be covert, arming opposition groups is not portrayed as 
trafficking but rather “military aid” or “lethal aid” by the donor countries. Though it may go 
against international laws, sending weapons to rebels is not labeled illegal or an act of war. 
Yet a closer look shows that these transactions are an integral part of the war economy. In 
the end there can be no defining line between the messy civil war and the state actors that 
are contributing to it. They are completely intertwined in the chaos, yet unable to control 
anything beyond inputs to the system.  
Why is the response to the intrastate conflict increasingly a form of militarization? Why 
not disarmament and other steps to limit the availability of weapons? The regulation of the 
arms trade has always necessarily been state centered, but given the interconnectedness of 
governments with the defense industry, this is akin to the ‘wolf guarding the hen house’ or 
                                                
8 Newport, Frank. “Americans Disapprove of U.S. Decision to Arm Syrian Rebels”, Gallup, June 13, 
2013, accessed May 19, 2015, http://www.gallup.com/poll/163112/americans-disapprove-decision-arm-syrian-
rebels.aspx 
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to Wall Street regulating itself. Through the use of embargoes and treaties, states, along with 
international organizations appear to be part of the solution while still contributing to the 
creation of insecurity. What is truly needed is a global campaign to reverse the process of 
militarization and demand the destruction of all arms, not only nuclear and chemical 
weapons. While this ideal may be far in the future, small steps can be taken to limit 
production and destroy surplus arms. 
Others have explored the history of Syria and the influence of the Iraq war in explaining 
how the conflict has become so protracted. This paper will focus on intervention through 
arms transfers, specifically looking at the territorial border states of Jordan and Turkey and 
the regional rivalry of Saudi and Qatar. The first chapter will show how national interests 
and ideological differences led these states to arm competing factions within Syria rather 
than utilizing a regional strategy to deal with the crisis. I will describe in detail the types of 
arms, origins and routes that have been used for the transfers, according to the best sources 
available. The routes of arms transfers are transnational, complex and covert, making them 
extremely difficult to track. They utilize brokers, transporters and other intermediaries who 
may all be from different countries than the source or destination of the arms. The networks 
used by governments feed into the same illicit economies that thrive in unstable 
environments and can therefore have radical unintended consequences. The second chapter 
will focus on how small arms flows have contributed to the transformation from revolution 
to civil war in Syria. Through militarization and the associated use of identity politics, 
regional intervention through arms has exacerbated the conflict and threatened to engulf 
neighboring areas. Chapter 3 explores the weaknesses of the current state-centered system of 
arms control, specifically embargoes and the new Arms Trade Treaty. These traditional arms 
control mechanisms are extremely limited in their effectiveness due to their reliance on 
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states for implementation and the lack of an international enforcement body. The final 
chapter addresses the related problem of surplus arms and the need to shift the focus to 
disarmament rather than re-armament. Disarmament could potentially have a positive 
impact, but thus far programs have been quite limited. Likewise, buyback programs show 
promise but tend to target larger or unconventional weapons rather than more common small 
arms. Destruction of surplus stocks and shrinking the defense industry are both imperative to 
prevent the continual spread of old weapons to new conflict zones. 
The issue of arms transfers to Syria has implications for many other conflicts and is a 
reflection of the broader culture of militarism that rules foreign policy today. Similar 
patterns can currently be seen in the Ukraine, where Russia is arming rebels, Yemen, where 
Iran is arming Houthi rebels, and Sudan has been accused of arming a host of militant 
groups in central Africa.9 The list goes on. The practice is not new, but is becoming 
increasingly accepted as the status quo by the global community. This thesis will address 
potential consequences of this pattern and why current means of arms control have been 
unsuccessful at preventing it.  
                                                
9 Grove, Thomas and Strobel, Warren. “Special Report: Where Ukraine's separatists get their weapons,” 
Reuters, July 29, 2014, accessed May 19, 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/07/29/us-ukraine-crisis-
arms-specialreport-idUSKBN0FY0UA20140729 
 
Nissenbaum, Dion. “U.S. Moves to Stem Iran Arms Flow to Yemen,” The Wall Street Journal, April 12, 2015, 
accessed May 19, 2015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-wants-to-block-iran-from-arming-yemens-houthi-
rebels-1428868461 
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I. Chapter One: Arms Transfers in the Syrian Conflict 
This chapter will address how small arms and light weapons (SALW) have been 
transported to Syria since the start of the revolution in early 2011. Although there are still 
arms coming to the Syrian government from Iran and Russia, I wish to highlight the other 
side of the conflict, namely the arming of opposition groups. Governments typically have 
stockpiles of weapons available at the outset of a conflict, making it less likely that an 
escalation of arms transfers to the state will occur (Moore 2012). Indeed, the Syrian 
government has accumulated a plethora of conventional and non-conventional weaponry 
since at least the Cold War era, making its current arms deals less consequential to the 
immediate situation.10 
I will illustrate the global dimension of this conflict by highlighting black market 
smuggling routes across Syria’s borders with Lebanon and Iraq, but I will be looking most 
closely at the borders of Jordan and Turkey, where the line between licit and illicit weapons 
transfers becomes very blurry. It is there that foreign governments have become integrally 
involved in shipments of SALW to Syrian opposition groups, acting to preserve their own 
geopolitical interests in a manner reminiscent of U.S.-Soviet proxy wars.  
The patterns of these weapons flows will also shine a light on certain dynamics of the 
fighting itself and relations between opposition groups. There appear to be two dominant 
networks that have been supplying SALW to opposition groups: Saudi Arabia with U.S. and 
Jordanian support, and Qatar with Turkish and Libyan support. The two groups have tended 
to support rival militant factions but there is some crossover between them, notably by the 
United States. Jordan has been a reluctant but crucial actor, allowing the use of its territory 
                                                
10 Reed, John. “Just How Deadly Is Assad’s Arsenal?”, Foreign Policy, July 16, 2012, accessed May 20, 
2015, http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/07/16/just-how-deadly-is-assads-arsenal/ 
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and border for making the transfers. The Libyan piece of the network is connected to 
previous alliances constructed during the Libyan civil war.   
These trafficking patterns have led to the regionalization of the conflict and have 
contributed to the transformation in Syria from revolution to civil war due to the 
relationships between foreign networks along with external national interests. Three 
transformative mechanisms in this process -militarization, sectarianism, and fragmentation 
of the opposition- will be thoroughly discussed in Chapter 2.  Although some of the states 
mentioned above readily admit to providing arms and funding to groups in Syria, several 
continue to deny or deflect the numerous reports of these transfers occurring. Due to the 
covert nature of the small arms trade I have relied mainly on news reports of alleged 
transfers and interviews of militants by journalists to determine the likely channels through 
which SALW have flowed to the conflict. In some cases there have also been official UN 
investigations and reports to uphold these findings. 
 
A Multidimensional Proxy War 
Emile Hokayem at the International Institute for Strategic Studies has explained the 
complexity of the Syrian conflict through the intersection of five distinct “fault lines” 
(Hokayem 2013). These include the breakdown between government and society, the 
struggle for dominance between Iran and Arab states, the Sunni-Shia divide, the rise of 
political Islamism opposed to secular groups, and the balance of minorities in multi-ethnic 
societies. Each of these fault lines gives rise to its own unique dynamics within the conflict 
and attracts the interest of foreign parties.  
Charles Lister of the Brookings Institute recently identified at least eight distinct conflict 
fronts active across the country, between combinations of the following players: the 
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“opposition”, the regime, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, Hezbollah, Kurdish 
forces, Jabhat al-Nusra, and eastern tribes.11 Each of these factions could be subdivided 
much further, but they are all receiving military funding and support from different sources. 
While the arms flows considered here are state funded and arranged, the sources and 
routes are multifaceted and private entities are relied on to complete the transactions. For 
each instance of arms transfers, there are many intermediaries between the sponsoring 
government and the rebels that receive them. For example, weapons may be sourced in one 
country, such as Croatia or Ukraine, the deal brokered by nationals from another state, flown 
to Jordan or Turkey by a cargo plane registered in a third state, and then finally transported 
across the border to Syria in trucks. The entire operation may be financed and directed by 
one country, but the route is clearly transnational and every middleman receives a slice of 
the pie. “Actors in illegal arms transfer activities may include corrupt government officials, 
dealers who buy and sell arms, arms brokers who facilitate contacts between potential 
buyers and sellers of weapons and who do not own the weapons being offered for sale, and 
persons involved in the transport and smuggling of the weapons” (Wezeman 2003, 24). 
These kinds of operations are also difficult to define as strictly legal or illegal. Diversion 
often occurs, meaning that small arms are shifted from legal to illicit markets by being 
transferred to parties other than the intended recipients. Diversion can be intentional or not, 
but almost always involve government actors either through corruption or neglect (Stohl 
2005). "Covert sales may be government-sponsored but nonetheless violate international 
law, defy UN arms embargoes or ignore national policies" (Stohl et al. 2007, 13). 
 
                                                
11 Lister, Charles. “The 'Real' Jabhat al-Nusra Appears to Be Emerging”, The World Post, August 7, 2014, 
accessed May 20, 2015, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/charles-lister/the-real-jabhat-al-
nusra_b_5658039.html 
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A. Saudi Arabian Support 
In February 2012, the Saudi Foreign Minister, Prince Saud al-Faisal was asked by the 
press what he thought about arming the Syrian rebels. He replied that he thought it was “an 
excellent idea”.12 There were at that time already some allegations of Saudi Arabia sending 
arms or funding to opposition members, and in May 2012 the Guardian reported that they 
witnessed the transfer of rifles and ammunition to leaders of the Free Syrian Army (FSA) on 
the Turkish border.13 
By October of that year the New York Times claimed that FSA fighters in Syria were 
talking openly about Saudi arms donations, although the kingdom had not yet officially 
acknowledged them.14 According to one rebel commander, the Saudis seemed to be focused 
on financing more secular groups. Around the same time, some Ukrainian ammunition was 
found in Aleppo and Croatian small arms started showing up in videos posted by rebels. 
Both could be traced to Saudi Arabia, the former having been clearly diverted from a sale to 
the kingdom and the latter having been flown from Croatia, possibly on Jordanian cargo 
planes.15 
                                                
12 al-Aswat, Asharq, “Syrian opposition praises Saudi FM position”, al-Aswat, February 25, 2012, 
accessed May 20, 2015, http://www.aawsat.net/2012/02/article55243080 
 
13 “Saudi sends military equipment to Syria rebels: diplomat”, Gulf News, March 17, 2012, accessed May 
20, 2015, http://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/saudi-arabia/saudi-sends-military-equipment-to-syria-rebels-
diplomat-1.995918#.T2TRmZtck9M.twitter 
Chulov, Martin et al. “Saudi Arabia plans to fund Syria rebel army”, The Guardian, June 22, 2012, accessed 
May 20, 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/jun/22/saudi-arabia-syria-rebel-army 
 
14 Worth, Robert F. “Citing U.S. Fears, Arab Allies Limit Syrian Rebel Aid”, The New York Times, 
October 6, 2012, accessed May 20, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/07/world/middleeast/citing-us-
fears-arab-allies-limit-aid-to-syrian-rebels.html?hpw 
 
15 “‘Saudi weapons' seen at Syria rebel base”, BBC, October 8, 2012, accessed January 3, 2015, 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-19874256 
Chivers, C.J., “What a Crate in Syria Says About Saudi Help to the Rebels”, The New York Times, October 
11, 2012, accessed January 5, 2015, http://atwar.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/10/11/what-a-crate-in-syria-says-
about-saudi-help-to-the-rebels 
Chivers, C.J. and Schmitt, Eric, “Saudis Step Up Help for Rebels in Syria With Croatian Arms”, The New York 
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In August 2013, Jordan agreed to allow Saudi Arabia to send a new class of weapon 
through its borders: Russian made anti-tank missiles called Konkurs.16 These missiles were a 
step up from the small arms that had so far been transferred to southern opposition groups. 
Konkurs were soon followed by Saudi Arabian promises of Chinese made anti-aircraft 
missiles and permission was given by Jordanian authorities following the failure of Geneva 
II negotiations in early 2014. 
Taken altogether, these news reports from early 2012 through 2014 describe SALW and 
ammunition from a variety of sources and several different paths of transfer. The original 
sources identified so far are Russia, Ukraine, China and Croatia, which has a surplus of 
small arms left over from the Balkans wars in the 1990s. Among the weapons described in 
these reports are Kalashnikovs, Yugoslav-made recoilless guns, assault rifles, grenade 
launchers, machine guns, mortars, shoulder fired rockets and finally Russian anti-tank 
missiles (Konkurs) and Chinese made anti-aircraft missiles.17  
The shipments that Saudi Arabia has allegedly financed have travelled to Syria primarily 
through the Jordan, although some have also crossed over the Turkish and Lebanese borders. 
In early 2012 the path through Turkey was used to bring some material to the FSA and 
Ukrainian arms showed up from across the Lebanese border in March 2013. Convincing the 
Jordanian government to allow these arms shipments to cross the border was a struggle for 
the Saudi government in the beginning and has continued to be an obstacle throughout the 
                                                                                                                                                 
Times, February 25, 2013, accessed January 7, 2015, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/26/world/middleeast/in-shift-saudis-are-said-to-arm-rebels-in-syria.html 
 
16 Al-Khalidi, Suleiman, “New Saudi-supplied missiles boost rebels in south Syria”, Reuters, August 15, 
2013, accessed January 5, 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/15/us-syria-crisis-arms-
idUSBRE97E0QH20130815 
 
17 Chulov, Martin et al. “Saudi Arabia plans to fund Syria rebel army”, The Guardian, June 22, 2012, 
accessed May 20, 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/jun/22/saudi-arabia-syria-rebel-army 
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war. In April 2013 Jordan partially acquiesced and soon there were reports of Croatian and 
Yugoslavian stocks as well as Russian Konkurs. One of the reasons for transferring weapons 
of Russian or Soviet models is that it allows the fighters to more easily integrate them with 
the equipment captured from the Syrian army that they are already using.18 
According to the available reports Saudi weapons were provided chiefly to FSA aligned 
groups, including the Southern Front and the Syrian Revolutionaries Front. A Carter Center 
report states that the kingdom also tends to favor the brigades of the Syrian Islamic 
Liberation Front, which is described as more moderate than the Islamic Front (The Carter 
Center 2014). Saudi Arabia has provided arms in the south in coordination with the center in 
Jordan known as the Military Operations Command. Jordan and U.S. intelligence have been 
working in concert there since at least 2013 although Jordan publicly denies the existence of 
the center.19  
There may be one important exception to the recipients of Saudi weapons: the militant 
group called Jaish al-Islam (JAI). JAI is a member of the Islamic Front based just east of 
Damascus and was created through a merger of 43 brigades in September 2013. Shortly 
thereafter Saudi Arabia announced its intention to provide millions of dollars to train and 
arm JAI as a counter to Jabhat al-Nusra.20 It was recently reported that this Islamist and 
Salafist militia is on the front lines of the fight for Damascus. “On the day that the Saudi 
King, Abdullah, died, the Saudi proxy force in Syria — Zahran Alloush’s Jaish al-Islam — 
                                                
18 Cloud, David and Abdulrahim, Raja, “U.S. has secretly provided arms training to Syria rebels since 
2012”, Los Angeles Times, June 21, 2013, accessed May 20, 2015, 
http://articles.latimes.com/2013/jun/21/world/la-fg-cia-syria-20130622 
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fired rockets into Damascus. Alloush had announced on Twitter that he would “shower the 
capital with hundreds of rockets a day in response to the regime’s barbaric air strikes on 
Ghouta’”.21 
It is also worth noting that in December 2013, Saudi Arabia placed an order for 
approximately 15,000 U.S. TOW anti-tank missiles, about three times as many as their 
current stock.22 Analysts speculate that they could be needed to replace the missiles being 
transferred to Syrian rebels, although they are not technically allowed to give the new U.S. 
weapons directly to Syrians because of strict transfer laws.23 
 
Rivalry with Iran 
One of the most obvious explanations for the support that Saudi Arabia has given to 
Syrian rebels is their long-standing rivalry with Iran. The apparent religious divide between 
the Sunni-majority Saudis and the Shia-majority Iranians is usually portrayed as the cause of 
their disharmony, but it is more likely that their real differences are primarily political.    
Before the Iranian revolution in 1979, the two countries had more interests in common 
than not. With the Shah in power, both countries were keen to counter “radical” socialist and 
nationalist influences in the region, and were exporting their oil and gas to similar trading 
partners (Furtig 2007). “Everything changed for the Saudis in 1979. The Iranian revolution 
was a greater threat to the Saudis than the Nasserite movement of 1952…because the Iranian 
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revolution could not be called secular  (Prashad 2015). Prashad believes that overthrowing 
the Shah of Iran (a monarch) was a direct ideological threat to the kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 
“The problem isn’t Shia-Sunni. It’s Muslim monarchy vs. Muslim republic” (Prashad 2015). 
It is difficult to make the case that the differences between Saudi Arabia and Iran are of a 
purely religious nature. There are instances of inter-sectarian cooperation, for example the 
sympathies between Hezbollah and Hamas.  “What initially appears as a Sunni-Shi’a split 
may in fact be a pattern of alliance making with motives far less sectarian in nature. The 
split not only coincides with the divide between pro- and anti-US orientations, but it also 
nicely complies with a classic balance of power logic, according to which other regional 
states will ally in order to balance a rising regional power, Shi’a or not” (Morten et al. 2007, 
6). 
Whether the reason is political, religious or a little bit of both, identity politics have 
come to reign over the Syrian conflict as the (mostly) Sunni rebels are supported by the Gulf 
states against the minority Alawi regime. Hokayem and many others assert that Saudi 
Arabia has sought to limit the influence of Iran in the Levant by undermining President 
Assad. “Damascus was seen as the prime enabler of Iranian influence in the Levant and, as 
an Arab state, an embarrassing irritant to self-proclaimed Saudi leadership of the Arab 
world” (Hokayem 2013, 108).  
There is also the issue of Syria’s suspected role in the 2005 assassination of Rafiq Hariri, 
former Lebanese prime minister and leader of the March 14th coalition. Hariri had dual 
Saudi-Lebanese citizenship and was very close to the royal family.24 Saudi Arabia has 
maintained its connection with the March 14th group, which supports the opposition in Syria 
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as a counterweight to the Iranian-influenced Hezbollah forces. Zambelis writes: “Saudi 
Arabia in particular saw the uprising in Syria as an opportunity to undermine the Hezbollah-
led March 8 coalition in Lebanon while strengthening the March 14 coalition headed by the 
Sunni-led Future Movement” (Zambelis 2013, 10). 
While Saudi Arabia may have a special rivalry with Iran, limiting Iranian influence is a 
common goal shared by many if not all of the states in the Gulf Cooperation Council. 
According to Angela Joya, the Gulf states "share with the U.S. and Britain the common goal 
of neutralizing Iran as a potential nuclear power that could shift the ‘balance of power’” 
against the Sunni ruled states of the Gulf” (Joya 2012, 37). 
 
Fear of blowback 
Apart from the antagonism toward Iran, another serious concern for Saudi leaders is the 
threat of domestic instability. Maintaining control over a population that for the most part 
does not identify with their Wahhabi doctrine is becoming more of a challenge (Khashan 
2014). For this reason, there has been a measure of caution used when determining which 
groups should receiving Saudi funded military support. Many of the jihadi oriented militant 
groups fighting for the opposition would present a threat to the kingdom if their ideology 
were to spread. “While born of the same Salafist ideology as the kingdom's own Wahhabist 
brand of Islam, these jihadist groups claim a purity of motive and a deadly modus operandi 
that endangers the House of Saud” (Khashan 2014). 
This is why the Saudi government has tried to concentrate its financial and material 
support on the FSA and more secular groups. They would like to prevent Jabhat al-Nusra 
and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) from getting too close to Jordan, or 
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infiltrating the Saudi kingdom itself through the return of foreign fighters. Speaking to the 
latter point, "King Abdullah and his government in Saudi Arabia have warned their subjects 
against traveling to Syria to wage jihad and have forbidden citizens to send money to Syrian 
groups”.25 A member of the religious authority also issued a fatwa in 2012 forbidding jihad 
in Syria, but not ruling out other kinds of support for the opposition.26 
A key point to note is that although the government of Saudi Arabia may avoid 
supporting groups like Jabhat al-Nusra directly, there are well established networks of 
businessmen within the country and surrounding Gulf states that have been quite successful 
at funneling support to these groups (Munif 2014). 
 
US coordination 
Another factor that impacts the Saudi support to the opposition is their close 
coordination with the United States. There are command centers set up in both Turkey and 
Jordan that have CIA personnel present in order to monitor the situation and vet rebel groups 
before they receive arms.27  28 There is a prevalent assumption among regional actors that 
the U.S. controls all military equipment entering Syria from those two borders.29 However, 
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the extent of American control of is impossible to ascertain and it is likely that smuggling 
networks would remain strong regardless of U.S. presence along the Turkish and Jordanian 
borders. 
One of the central concerns for the U.S. has been to prevent larger weapons, particularly 
shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles (known as MANPADs), from entering the country and 
potentially ending up in the hands of anti-American militants. For the first two or three years 
of the conflict, Saudi leaders acquiesced to U.S. wishes on this matter and only in 2014 did 
they begin to talk about providing anti-aircraft missiles to certain groups. 
Along with the drive to arm the opposition and the restraint to prevent certain arms from 
reaching more radical groups, there is also the possibility that Saudi leaders would not 
actually prefer a complete regime change in Syria. It may be more advantageous for them to 
have a weaker but well-known enemy than the unknown factions that could come into 
power if the Assad regime were to fall. In addition, keeping trade routes open through Syria 
to the Arabian Peninsula is likely to be very important to them.30 
"While Saudi Arabia has maintained an uncompromising diplomatic posture toward 
Damascus, the realization has started to set it in in Riyadh that the Ba’athist regime has 
proven far more resilient and capable than initially believed” (Zambelis 2013, 11). 
 
B. Qatari Support 
The small gulf kingdom of Qatar, home to just over 2 million people, has played a very 
significant role in arming the Syrian opposition. In March 2012, at the same time that local 
military councils began to be formed, then prime minister Hamad bin Jassim bin Jaber bin 
Muhammad Al Thani declared his intention to help support the opposition "by all means, 
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including giving them weapons”.31 In mid-May reports started flowing in of the FSA 
securing Qatari funded arms, although the government maintained an official position of 
denial. By 2013 it was clear that, like Saudi Arabia, Qatar was arranging shipments of 
SALW to Syria through many different pathways. 
In late 2012 there were accounts of Qatar providing and distributing arms through the 
March 14th camp in Lebanon, then smuggled across the Syrian border.32 The same 
newspaper confirmed the presence of French and British intelligence officers coordinating 
those arms transfers. A second supply route was revealed in 2013 by a Lebanese journalist: 
“The weapons are purchased mainly from Eastern Europe by arms brokers based in Britain 
and France, and are flown from Qatar to Ankara and then trucked to Syria”.33 This was 
backed up by a SIPRI researcher who confirmed that 90 military cargo planes were flown 
from Qatar to Turkey during 2012. A third alleged source of weapons purchased by Qatar is 
Sudan, which has its own state-run arms production operation. Reports of Sudanese and 
Chinese weapons being sold to Qatar and transported from to Turkey were confirmed by 
Western officials and Syrian rebels.34 It is likely that Croatia has also been used as a source 
country in the Qatar-Turkey-Syria route.35 The last but possibly most frequent source used 
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by Qatar has been Libya. With the fall of the Gaddafi regime came the looting of his 
extensive weapons arsenals that he had accumulated for the past [50] years or so. There have 
been many accounts of shipments from Libya to Syria, the majority of which were flights 
financed by Qatar from Libya to Turkey.36 
In contrast to Saudi Arabia, Qatar chose to work primarily through Turkey to supply 
rebel brigades in the north of Syria. The result of this has been that while Saudi Arabia 
supported mainly regime defectors and some Salafist groups, Qatar veered toward more 
Islamist factions, particularly those associated with the Muslim Brotherhood such as Liwa 
al-Tawhid (Hokayem 2013). To put it simply, "Saudi Arabia has avoided funding 
Brotherhood elements, whereas Qatar has not” (McCants et al. 2013, 6). 
Liwa al-Tawhid, also known as al-Tawhid Brigade, was originally a member of the FSA 
but joined the Islamic Front due to frustrations with leadership and funding (Munif 2014). 
The Islamic Front formed in November 2013 in protest against western backed political 
opposition, and is somewhat hostile to the FSA. It remains one of the most powerful 
alliances within the opposition37.  
Qatar has reportedly channeled weapons to another militant group under the Islamic 
Front banner, called Ahrar al-Sham, which has been known to fight in coordination with 
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Jabhat al-Nusra, an al-Qaeda linked group.38 However, Ahrar al-Sham also receives 
substantial funding from Kuwait.39 
 
Rivalry with Saudi Arabia 
Qatar has much in common with Saudi Arabia and the two countries may appear to be 
working together by supporting the Syrian opposition. Beneath the surface, however, there is 
“a deeper rivalry for regional influence that is being played out in parallel with the broader, 
multi-dimensional proxy battle that has come to embody Syria’s civil war” (The Carter 
Center 2014, 22). Even within the FSA, Qatar and Saudi Arabia have competed by 
supporting different factions (Hokayem 2013).  
Part of this rivalry stems from their different attitudes toward the Muslim Brotherhood 
(MB). As mentioned above in relation to Iran, Saudi Arabia fears any model that could 
challenge their monarchy. First, the MB presents a religious model that can compete with 
Wahabbism because it’s not quite as harsh and strict.40 Secondly, the Brotherhood presents a 
political challenge through its grassroots organization. "The Wahabbist and Salafist 
principles that serve as the foundation of Saudi Arabia’s legitimacy, especially as they relate 
to the unquestioned loyalty demanded by its rulers, was inherently threatened by the activist-
oriented approach to politics advocated by the Muslim Brotherhood” (Zambelis 2013, 12). 
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Qatar doesn’t share the same fears of the Brotherhood as its larger neighbor. Although 
Qatar also enjoys a monarchical political system, a substantial portion of their population is 
made up of foreign nationals, making the likelihood of a popular uprising very small 
(Zamabelis 2013). On the other hand, Qatar is following in the footsteps of Saudi Arabia by 
cultivating strong alliances with Western states, particularly the U.S., who are more than 
willing to build up their military capabilities by selling them advanced weaponry. With this 
newfound power, "Qatar and the United Arab Emirates have emerged as activist states in 
their interest and willingness to intervene both militarily and financially in the politics of 
neighbouring Arab states” (Young 2013, 5). 
 
Part of a Larger Strategy 
Syria has not been an isolated intervention for Qatar. When we look at their participation 
in Egypt and Libya especially, it becomes clear that arming Syrian rebels was part of a 
larger strategy to secure their own survival by supporting potential emerging leaders. "In 
contrast [to Saudi Arabia], Qatar viewed the wave of uprisings as a chance to enhance its 
regional posture and expand its influence globally” (Zambelis 2013, 11). 
Libya is by far the most interesting state used to export weapons for rebels because it 
reveals how Syria is just one part of Qatar's larger strategy of regional intervention. Qatar 
was the only Arab supporter of the NATO led intervention to oust Gaddafi in 2011, and they 
did more than their share of arming and funding the Libyan opposition at that time. Early on 
in the uprising, the Obama administration approved Qatar’s request to begin shipping and 
selling arms to the rebel alliance in Libya, so long as they were not U.S. weapons.41 At that 
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time Qatar relied mostly on Russian and French weapons. Soon after, the U.S. became 
concerned with reports that arms were going to groups that were considered hard line 
Islamists, and that the U.S. had very little control over who was receiving these weapons. 
The elements of the Libyan opposition that Qatar was arming are of the same ideological 
makeup as the groups it chose to support in Syria and in Egypt. Prashad draws parallels 
between Saudi-Qatar tensions in Libya, Egypt and Syria, suggesting that Saudi Arabia 
helped finance the overthrow of Morsi (MB) in Egypt and is supporting opposite factions in 
Libya in order to minimize the Brotherhood’s role.42 Qatar’s strategy in those three countries 
was also deeply connected. Before the Arab Spring Qatar was one of Assad’s strongest allies 
(Hokayem 2013). The kingdom made the decision to drastically cut ties with Syria and 
began funneling arms to the opposition while they were in the midst of the Libya 
intervention (Bali et al. 2012).43 
Qatar is not only arming similar types of militias in Syria, they are probably using the 
same arms pipelines to do it. "One former senior Obama administration familiar with the 
transfers said the Qatari government built relationships with Libyan militias in 2011”.44 
According to a UN report concerning the violation of the arms embargo to and from Libya, 
arms and ammunition from Libya were among the first shipments of weapons to be 
transferred to the Syrian opposition (Security Council 2014[1], 42). The Panel of Experts is 
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currently still investigating Qatar's alleged involvement in these transfers, but it does 
acknowledge that: "Qatar was a strong supporter of the Libyan revolution, to which it 
provided significant quantities of military materiel (S/2013/99, paras. 62- 73). The 
authorities may have used this relationship to acquire materiel to be transferred to the Syrian 
opposition” (Security Council 2014[1], 48). 
 
The flow of Libyan weapons to Syria 
In addition to Qatari financed transfers, there have been several instances of arms 
deliveries from Libya to the Syrian opposition that may have been coordinated without 
additional state support. The lack of security following the overthrow of Gaddafi left state 
weapons arsenals open to looting by any enterprising groups or individuals. Libyan arms 
have since been spread to conflict zones all over northern Africa as well as farther 
destinations like Syria (Security Council 2014[1]).  
Libyan weapons were readily available for export beginning in 2011, and Syrian rebels 
wasted no time in making connections to potential suppliers. In the spring of that year, 
Syrian National Council (SNC) representatives visited Libya to ask for arms support 
directly.45 In return, the leader of the Tripoli Military Council flew to Turkey to meet with 
FSA members in November 2011. This communication between Libyan and Syrian 
opposition groups reflects a strong sense of solidarity that existed throughout the Arab 
Spring revolutions. In this particular case there was an even stronger connection because 
Assad was known to have sent weapons and support to Gaddafi at the beginning of the 
Libyan revolution. 
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In September 2012, an FSA member claimed that a large delivery of weapons was 
received in Turkey on a Libyan ship called The Intisaar.46 According to the Times, the arms 
received in that shipment included shoulder-fired SAM-7 surface-to-air anti-aircraft missiles 
and rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs). A UN investigation into these allegations was not 
able to confirm the cargo of The Intisaar because the ship manifest listed only humanitarian 
items (Security Council 2013). The delivery was cosigned by the Humanitarian Relief 
Foundation (IHH), an Islamic relief organization based in Turkey that has been accused of 
arms trafficking on separate occasions. If the Times’ reporting is correct, this would be a 
very typical example of arms smuggling. 
According to an international cargo shipper, there were almost weekly shipments from 
Libya to Syria in 2012, leaving from both Misrata and Benghazi. "The size of the arms cargo 
varied, but some of his ships carried in excess of 600 tons of weapons”.47 The ships 
described by this source were headed to Lebanon or Turkey to be offloaded and transported 
to Syria, but after one ship was blocked by the Lebanese government, traffickers began 
switching to chartered planes.48  
A UN investigation into the Libyan arms embargo did manage to confirm the cargo of 
that ship, named Letfallah II, which was seized by Lebanese authorities on April 27, 2012 
(Security Council 2013). Letfallah was registered to and flying the flag of Sierra Leone. The 
panel confirmed that the cargo seized on this ship consisted of Libyan weapons headed to 
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Tripoli, Lebanon. "Among the arms inspected by the Panel, advanced weapons systems and 
components were found, including SA-24 short range surface-to-air missiles and SA-7b 
man-portable air defense systems, anti-tank guided missiles (Metis-M, Konkurs-M and 
MILAN) and various types of small, light and heavy weapons and ammunition” (Security 
Council 2013). A Lebanese investigation came to the conclusion that the shipment had been 
initiated and financed by Syrian citizens (Security Council 2014[1]). 
While no link to Qatar was presented by the UN or Lebanese investigations, the 
possibility of their involvement has not been ruled out. Franklin Lamb, director of the NGO 
Americans Concerned for Middle East Peace, remarked, "We know that Qatar and Saudi 
Arabia control five warehouses in the area of Benghazi. So the great suspicion is that the 
intercepted arms are from those left over from the Libya campaign."49 In June 2012, The 
Telegraph reported from diplomatic sources that “Libyan-supplied weapons, paid for by 
Saudi Arabia and Qatari government funds and private donations, had already been 
stockpiled in anticipation of the "inevitable" intervention needed to end the Assad regime”.50  
 
C. American Support 
The Obama administration has been talking about supporting the Syrian opposition 
since very early in the conflict. Many analysts argue that there has been too much talk and 
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not enough action.51 Some even suggest that the rise of ISIL and the protracted stalemate 
between Assad and the opposition can be attributed to Obama’s policies. It is true that he has 
acted more cautiously than other presidents might have, but the actions of the United States 
in the Syrian conflict should not be understated. While American influence may be waning 
economically and politically, it is still the global leader in terms of military capacity, 
weapons production, and intelligence. 
In June 2012 U.S. defense secretary Leon Panetta stated that Washington was not 
playing a direct role in arms transfers into Syria. "We made a decision not to provide lethal 
assistance at this point. I know others have made their own decisions.”52 At the same time, 
the FSA was meeting with State Department officials to present a list of weaponry they 
hoped would be provided by the U.S. or their allies.53 The U.S. agreed only to help 
coordinate assistance to the rebels, and offered $15million in non-lethal aid but still claimed 
that they would not provide weaponry.54 
During the same month it became known that the CIA had been operating on the 
Turkish border for several weeks, helping to vet opposition fighters and determine who 
received arms.55 A similar command center was also set up in Jordan.56 In May 2013, a 
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Qatari official acknowledged that Qatari arms shipments were being tightly coordinated with 
the CIA: “Today, Qatari shipments have resumed with tighter controls exerted from the 
palace of Qatar’s emir, Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani, in consultation with the U.S. 
Central Intelligence Agency”.57 So although the U.S. maintained deniability about providing 
lethal aid, the CIA and State Department were very well informed and attempted to control 
the flow of arms into Syria. 
In early 2013 the White House was considering providing more military related 
assistance, including training.58 A few months later information surfaced indicating that the 
CIA and other U.S. Special Operations forces had already been training FSA members in 
Turkey and Jordan since late 2012.59 Those rebel forces were reportedly being trained to use 
anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons, which are the types that the administration had been 
most wary of providing.  
In June 2013, after coming to the conclusion that the Assad regime had indeed used 
chemical weapons on the population, Obama finally announced that the U.S. would begin to 
provide military support, training, and possibly anti-tank weapons to the Supreme Military 
Council (SMC).60 Funding for this assistance was approved sometime in December or 
January through classified sections of Defense appropriations legislation.61 
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By September, the CIA had begun distributing light weapons and munitions to the 
SMC headed by General Salim Idriss.62 In April 2014, U.S. made BGM-71 TOW anti-tank 
missiles began showing up in YouTube videos of Syrian rebels, leading analysts to believe 
that they had been provided directly by the U.S..63 It is worth noting for a second time that 
Saudi Arabia put in an order for 10,000 of the same BGM-71 TOW missiles at the end of 
2013 (SIPRI). 
The Iranian FARS news agency has claimed that the U.S. began sending military 
equipment and weapons from Kandahar base in Afghanistan directly to rebels in Syria, as 
they began the withdrawal of American troops from the country.64 According to the Iranian 
source, the material was sent to Jordan on Polish cargo planes and included "anti-armor and 
missile systems, rocket-launchers and rockets and tens of armored Humvees”.65 
In August 2013, Obama told senators that the first 50-man cell of trained fighters 
was on its way from Jordan to Syria.66 The CIA program in Jordan provided training in 
groups of about 40 soldiers and gave $500 to each graduate. "Weapons instruction was at the 
heart of the programme. Recruits were trained on Kalashnikovs, light machine guns, 
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mortars, anti-tank mines and SPG-9 unguided anti-tank missiles”.67 Between two and three 
thousand soldiers are estimated to have gone through the program as of 2014.68 
There is a second U.S. training program in Qatar, which had been operating for about 
a year as of September 2014. The militants in that program were trained in mortars, heavy 
machine guns and TOW anti-tank missiles, the latter of which they were allowed to keep.69 
The overall aim of this program was to counter the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant 
(ISIL), which emerged as a third force in the civil war in 2014. FSA affiliated rebels from 
Northern Syria, including the Mujahideen Army, were among the groups to take part in this 
training program.70 
The U.S. strategy of arming the Syrian opposition changed substantially over the 
course of 2013-2014. Initially a response to Assad’s alleged chemical weapons usage, the 
operation began as an effort to support the FSA forces against the regime. Brigades that 
were especially known for their U.S. support were the Mujahideen Army, Harakat Hazm, 
and Syrian Revolutionaries Front. American strategy shifted slightly in mid-2013 as they 
became more worried about the growing strength of certain Islamist factions. The U.S. 
began vetting local community leaders in Northern Syria with the aim of empowering 
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people that were definitely not affiliated with terror organizations.71 By December the U.S. 
had completely suspended arms transfers and military aid to the SMC after Islamist groups 
seized a weapons warehouse from “moderate” rebels.72 From then on they provided arms 
only through “trusted commanders”, although the problem of weapon leakages had only 
begun. During 2014 U.S. strategy continued shifting in response to the advancement of ISIL 
and Assad was no longer seen as enemy number one. 
 
Explaining American reactions 
There are several factors that could explain U.S. behavior towards the Syrian 
opposition. First, there was the hesitancy expressed by both Obama and members of the 
Pentagon regarding the effectiveness of supplying arms to an insurgent group and the 
possibility that weapons would end up in the hands of anti-American terrorists. In 2014 
Obama stated: “Very early in this process, I actually asked the C.I.A. to analyze examples of 
America financing and supplying arms to an insurgency in a country that actually worked 
out well. And they couldn’t come up with much".73 In June 2013 General Martin Dempsey, 
chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, warned the Senate that arming rebels could have 
unintended consequences.74 These hesitations also reflected the domestic political climate at 
the time, with most Americans very wary of getting involved in another Middle Eastern 
conflict. 
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Secondly, the initial U.S. reaction to the Syrian revolution was tacit support for 
Assad. The Obama administration had patched up relations with Syria beginning in 2009 
and “made engagement with Syria an essential element of its Middle East strategy” 
(Hokayem 2013, 151). This explains in part why the Western reaction to the Syrian 
revolution was more tentative and ambivalent in the first few months. 
Finally, the actions of the U.S. show that it was possible to be well informed and 
partly in control of the arms that are flowing to the opposition without actually being 
accountable for the consequences. This aspect of deniability has been an essential part of 
U.S. foreign policy for decades. During the Cold War the CIA carefully armed anti-
communist militants using soviet weapons or others that could not be traced back to the U.S. 
“While the United States and the Soviet Union had a hand in these transfers, they tried to 
conceal their involvement, using proxy sources and dealers. The United States routinely 
purchased Soviet bloc weapons for insurgent groups” (Stohl et al 2007, 8). This practice has 
become something of an official policy because of the strict laws prohibiting re-export to 
third countries. Even though the U.S. continues to sell their Middle Eastern allies billions of 
dollars of weapons annually, those importing countries can not use them to support 
opposition groups anywhere. They are forced to find alternate sources that involve complex 
smuggling schemes, as outlined above. 
 
D. Jordan: the reluctant supporting actor 
From the beginning of the conflict, Jordanian leaders saw the strategy of arming 
rebels as more of a threat than an opportunity. They were concerned about blowback from 
extremists coming back across the border, potential destabilization of the monarchy and 
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retaliation from Assad.75 Jordan’s minister of foreign affairs, Nasser Judeh, commented in 
response to a question about arming the rebels: “Our position was always, arming who? And 
do we have addresses and do we have CVs? ...We are a country that neighbors Syria, and 
therefore, while we don’t interfere in the internal affairs of Syria, we are certainly affected 
by the outcome of what’s going on in Syria”.76  
However, continuous pressure from both Saudi Arabia and the United States led 
Jordan to gradually concede more and more, eventually allowing the establishment of a 
training center, a command hub for distributing weapons, and of course access to the border 
to transfer all sorts of military equipment.  
The main point of leverage for both allies was Jordan’s dire financial situation, 
which has been made worse by the growing refugee crisis and the collapse of their tourism 
industry. The day that they agreed to let weapons across their border they also received a 
billion dollar aid package from Saudi Arabia.77 
 
 
E. The Role of Turkey 
Turkey is on the way to Syria from Iran, so unlike Jordan its borders have been subject 
to arms smuggling to both sides of the conflict. In September 2011, Turkey imposed an 
embargo on arms entering Syria and started intercepting both ships and planes suspected of 
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carrying weapons from Iran to Syria.78 In January 2012 they confiscated the cargo of five 
trucks believed to be carrying military equipment from Iran.79 
Turkish authorities have been much less stringent about arms being transferred to the 
opposition groups in Syria, and there have been many allegations that the Turkish 
government is directly supporting them. Rebels in Hatay province (just north of Syria) told a 
journalist in May 2012 that they were receiving training and light weapons from Turkey.80 
Members of an opposing political party have accused the government of funneling arms to 
Jabhat al-Nusra: "The Erdogan government has sent a large volume of heavy weapons to the 
terrorist group, the al-Nusra Front, affiliated to the al-Qaeda in Syria and this is while even 
the US has listed the al-Nusra as a terrorist group”.81 A Turkish prosecutor also claims to 
have evidence of this connection. Cihat Acikalin told journalists: “I may be violating the 
ethics rule as a lawyer, but I am choosing to talk to you because we believe that the 
government is suspending the rule of law by providing support to this opposition, including 
Jabhat al-Nusra, and putting our lives at risk here.”82 
President Erdogan has emphatically denied all of those charges, but at the very least the 
Turkish border is rife with smuggling networks that have been growing since before the start 
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of the revolution.83 The UN al-Qaeda Sanctions Committee found that most arms going to 
ISIL other than from Iraq and Syria are being smuggled through Turkey. "Most supplies 
have either been seized from the armed forces of Iraq or (to a lesser extent) the Syrian Arab 
Republic, or have been smuggled to ISIL and ANF, primarily by routes that run through 
Turkey” (Security Council 2014[2], 14). Of course this does not implicate the Turkish 
government, but does say something about the lack of security at the border. 
There is also evidence that whatever arms are coming through Turkey are not being 
evenly distributed among rebel groups. The brigades that are well connected with outside 
sources of arms are the more Islamist ones, who received support from Saudi and Qatar.84 
Well funded Islamist networks are likely able to take advantage of these black market 
networks more than the moderate forces that don’t have as much foreign funding.85 Some 
factions may even pretend to be more religiously oriented than they really are in order to 
attract more support. 
In 2014 certain Western governments began to point the finger at Turkey for allowing 
funds and arms support to reach extremist rebels in Syria. The Erdogan government has 
responded with intransigence, even when the evidence is indisputable. In late 2013 and early 
2014, two buses of ammunition and a truck carrying 1,000 mortars were seized on their way 
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to Hatay province.86 Prosecutors received a tip to search several trucks and were told by the 
Turkish Intelligence Service (MIT) that the cargo was a state secret. In the second case, 
prosecutors were able to search the trucks and found them full ammunition and weapons, but 
were unable to bring any charges because of the protection of MIT. One of these shipments 
was arranged by the Islamic charity called Humanitarian Relief Foundation (IHH), which is 
based, in the border town of Kilis.87 This is the same organization that was accused of arms 
smuggling aboard the Intisaar ship coming from Libya in 2012. 
 
Turkey’s Agenda 
Turkey’s direct role in arms transfers to the Syrian opposition remains unclear, but it is 
undeniable that they have lent support as a transit state and by keeping their southern border 
porous. Unlike Jordan, Turkey has been more closely aligned with Qatar than with Saudi 
Arabia or the U.S. “Qatar’s strategy of supporting MB-affiliated parties in Tunisia, Egypt, 
Libya and Syria also coincided with Turkey’s approach to the region” (Zambelis 2013, 11). 
The primary way that Turkey aligned itself with Qatar’s strategy was through hosting the 
Syrian National Council (SNC), providing sanctuary for Syrian army defectors, and 
allowing them to organize in refugee camps (Hokayem 2013). The SNC was seen by many 
as heavily favoring Muslim Brotherhood elements, and therefore as a Turkish/Qatari puppet 
with very little connection to groups on the ground in Syria. "Groups hostile to the 
Brotherhood allege that its members on the SNC used money the body received from Saudi, 
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Qatar, and Turkey to rebuild the Brotherhood network in Syria by channeling it to groups 
who pledged them loyalty” (McCants et al. 2013, 19). 
Like Qatar, Turkey’s relations with Assad before the revolution were very good. There 
had been a rapprochement between the two countries starting in 2003, and they built many 
economic ties while Turkey provided a bridge to the EU and other Western states (Hokayem 
2013). Within a few months of the uprising however, they had completely overturned their 
‘good neighbor policy’ and started calling for outright regime change in Syria. Today, 
getting rid of Assad remains Erdogan’s top priority in Syria, clashing with the goals of the 
U.S. However, when it comes to providing heavy weapons to the rebels, Turkey and the 
U.S. are on the same page. The U.S. fears anti-aircraft missiles getting into the hands of 
extremists. Turkey fears them getting into the hands of Kurdish separatists groups.88  
In the next chapter, I will outline some of the key characteristics of the Syrian 
transformation from revolution to civil war and how these may be connected to the specific 
patterns of SALW transfers described here. These characteristics include the initial 
militarization of the revolution, sectarianization and fragmentation of the armed opposition, 
the emergence of radical Islamist factions as strong participants, and the prolonged nature of 
the conflict demonstrated by a stalemate on the ground and two failed rounds of 
international peace negotiations.  
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II. Chapter Two: Transformation of the Conflict 
 In the previous chapter, I described in detail how small arms and light weapons 
(SALW) have been directly and indirectly transferred into Syria since the beginning of the 
conflict in 2011. The primary states involved in the direct transfer of weapons to the 
opposition have been Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Turkey, Jordan, and the United States. Iraq, 
Lebanon and Libya are among the states that have facilitated smuggling and indirect 
transfers into Syria. 
The current chapter will discuss key characteristics of the transformation from revolution 
to civil war in Syria that can be connected to the observed patterns of SALW transfers. The 
‘Arab Spring’ movements have led to drastically different results across the region. In 
Bahrain, the revolutionary spirit was quickly suppressed and order restored, while in Tunisia 
an almost hopeful atmosphere remains after the adoption of a new constitution and 
successful elections in 2014. When the revolution in Syria began, many doubted that it 
would last, but the violence of the regime coupled with the willingness and capability of the 
opposition to fight back led to the quick devolution into all out war. Three processes that 
were strongly evident in this transformation are also directly connected to the influx of arms 
and funding from external interests. They are: the initial militarization of the revolution, 
sectarianization and the emergence of radical Islamist factions as strong elements, and 
fragmentation of the armed opposition leading to prolongation of the conflict. 
 
A. Militarization of the Revolution 
David Kinsella defines militarization as "a process by which military capabilities are 
introduced and/or enhanced in some social realm" (Kinsella 2012, 105). In this case, I am 
using the term to describe the transformation from peaceful uprising to armed insurgency 
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that took place in Syria over the first year of the conflict. This process was dependent on the 
opposition's acquisition of military equipment, especially weapons and ammunition. 
This militarization, which did not occur on a wide scale until early 2012, is frequently 
explained simply as a reaction to the assault of the Assad regime. For example, "The 
emergence of an armed opposition...is an understandable response to the violence and 
brutality the regime of Bashar al-Assad has unleashed against peaceful protests".89 There are 
two ways in which the actions of the regime seem to have led the opposition to arm itself. 
First, the firing on protestors and indiscriminate bombing of entire neighborhoods that 
started in spring of 2011 led civilians to create communal self-defense units (Hokayem 
2013). The most accessible small arms would have been bought locally on the black market 
or through nearby trafficking networks, especially across the border of Lebanon. It has been 
well documented that the black market price for AK-47s rose steeply in Lebanon and Syria 
in 2011, indicating a shortage of supply (Marsh 2014). 
Secondly, while the Syrian Arab Army has been fairly resilient throughout the conflict in 
terms of internal structure, the continuous order to fire on their countrymen was a breaking 
point for many soldiers, especially those who had joined by conscription (Hokayem 2013). 
Defections from the army in large numbers began in the summer of 2011 and led to the 
formation of the Free Syrian Army (FSA). Many of these soldiers brought their own 
weapons with them and were therefore not reliant on external sources at first, although the 
Turkish government provided them safe haven and the freedom to organize.  
These two explanations, while accounting for initial defections and self-defense groups, 
tend to understate the impact of external actors that provided military support. "The Syrian 
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opposition would not have taken arms so easily had it not been convinced by Western 
support and incentives by Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and transnational Salafi networks" (Droz-
Vincent 2014, 57). Assad's actions also fail to explain how the opposition came to be 
comprised of hundreds of militant groups, many with high numbers of foreign fighters and 
links to international terrorist organizations. As I will illustrate below, the formation of the 
Syrian National Council (SNC) was a key moment that helps to illuminate how foreign 
powers like Turkey and Qatar came to play an important role in the conflict. 
The uprising in Syria did not begin as a heavily armed insurgency, but as a series of 
peaceful protests concentrated in rural working class areas. As soon as April 2011, networks 
of activists had set up Local Coordination Committees across the country, which organized 
nonviolent community protests every Friday (Hokayem 2013). Even in early 2015 these 
protests are still going on, although only about a dozen committees are still active.90 "It was 
clear from the beginning that nonviolent demonstrations were a powerful means for a 
societal revolt against a brutal regime, with slogans like “peacefully, peacefully”” (Droz-
Vincent 2014, 50). Another popular slogan among protesters was "non-violence even though 
they kill a hundred every day" (Haddad 2012). 
The protest organizers and nascent opposition groups did not take the topic of violence 
lightly. It was a subject of much debate in the early days of the uprising and caused 
fracturing among some of these groups. One coalition in particular was resolutely committed 
to nonviolence, but soon became marginalized compared to the growing number of armed 
factions (Joya 2012). The National Coordination Committee (NCC), also known as the 
National Coordination Body, was founded in June 2011 and has been described as an 
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"umbrella group of leftist, nationalist and Kurdish factions arguing for peaceful opposition 
to the regime" (Hokayem 2013, 71). The NCC stood out in another way: it was open to 
dialogue and negotiations with the regime (Pinto 2012). According to one of the founders of 
the NCC, Haytham Manna, there were three principles that the organization espoused: "no 
to foreign intervention; no to arming and violence; and no to sectarianism" (Haddad 2012). 
This can be contrasted with the SNC which immediately started issuing support for both 
intervention and violence as well as the unconditional resignation of Assad.  
The Syrian National Council was the result of a meeting that took place in Istanbul in 
August 2011. Dubbed the "Istanbul Group" by some, it was based in Turkey and therefore 
poised to be influenced more by external players than by Syrians on the ground. The NCC 
saw this as a problem from the beginning and was opposed to the group being based in 
Istanbul rather than Damascus. Manna explained their position: "It is simply not possible for 
an organization wanting to arm a population in a neighboring country [i.e., Syria] to not be 
under the political control of the host country [i.e., Turkey] (Haddad 2012). This was one of 
the reasons that the NCC withdrew from the SNC and quickly became marginalized due to 
their lack of financial support. The SNC meanwhile became recognized internationally as 
the main political opposition party (Munif 2014). 
The SNC was initially strongly influenced by both Turkey and Qatar and was modeled 
on the Libyan Transitional Council (Haddad 2012). Despite the protest of the NCC and other 
like-minded groups, this was possible in part due to the large numbers of exiled Syrians 
belonging to the Muslim Brotherhood (MB). The crackdown on MB members, especially by 
Hafiz Assad in the massacre of 1982, meant that by 2011 there was no official organization 
representing them in Syria. After decades of persecution and exile, the MB was primed to 
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use the revolution as an opportunity to regain political power. Turkey and Qatar gave them 
the means to organize and become the most influential voice in the SNC, but that also meant 
that the SNC had very little connection to the protests happening on the ground (Pinto 
2012). 
Although the SNC was comprised of both secular and religious groups, the MB was the 
most hegemonic group in it (Munif 2014). The MB did not take a sectarian position within 
the SNC, but it was nonetheless of an Islamist political bent, which is consistent with the 
types of opposition groups that Qatar has supported in Libya and Egypt. Qatar and others 
mirrored their political support for the SNC with financial and military support as described 
in the previous chapter. Arms patterns show that even before the FSA was formed, Qatar 
and Saudi Arabia were making arrangements to send weapons to rebels in Syria using the 
same trafficking networks they had forged during the Libyan revolution (See Chapter 2). 
These two countries began by funneling weapons to the FSA and then moved on to groups 
of a more Islamist character, many of which contained large percentages of foreign fighters.  
Once the militarization of the opposition was pervasive, the organization and funding of 
nonviolent activists couldn’t compare to that of the armed rebels (Hokayem 2013). 
Nationalist elements of the opposition also felt alienated from the foreign-based and foreign-
sponsored SNC. One of the most striking effects of militarization has been the masking of 
the socio-economic concerns that led to the protests in the first place. The original uprising 
in 2011 was formed by students, activists and intellectuals who were protesting social and 
economic policies (Joya 2012). These calls for meaningful change and democratic 
participation have been all but lost in the chaos of destruction that has engulfed the country 
for the past three years. Instead of dialogue and politics, Syrians continue to rip their country 
to shreds with the help and encouragement of outside parties. "When communication is 
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through rifles, the political discourse becomes marginalized...We thus cooperated with the 
regime in the same problem and crime. This crime was that of killing politics and replacing 
it with the military-security solution” (Haddad 2012). 
A second effect of militarization was the creation of a self-perpetuating justification for 
pouring more arms into the conflict and the region as a whole. On one side, the opposition's 
increasing violence played into the regime's hand because it legitimized the narrative that 
Assad was using all along (Droz-Vincent 2014). The Syrian regime relies on its allies, 
especially Iran and Hezbollah, for support against "foreign-backed terrorists".91 Conversely, 
the process of militarization has also legitimized calls for foreign intervention and for 
arming "moderate" rebels because they are left to either compete with more radical groups 
or disappear completely. 
It is frequently argued that Western-backed rebels have suffered from a lack of resources 
compared to groups that are more likely to cooperate with al-Qaeda.92 The unequal capacity 
among groups together with the rise of ISIL has led the United States and others to promise 
more support for moderates through weapons and training.93 Even though the U.S. has been 
involved in the process of vetting and arming rebels since 2012, analysts tend to criticize 
Obama only for not doing enough of the same. "The U.S. answer to the anti-interventionist 
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mood is a patchwork of covert, outsourced, half measures that seems likely to bring on the 
worst of Afghan warlordism and Talibanization, on the one hand, and Iraqi sectarianism, on 
the other" (Ahmad 2013).  
Proposed solutions are usually of a military nature, even while politicians continue to 
claim that "there is no military solution".94 One example is the suggestion of "managed 
militarization". This begs the question, who is the manager and who will be managed? 
Heydemann recommends the establishment of a Western-led group, through the Friends of 
Syria, to manage training and equipping of the opposition. "Rather than sidestep the tough 
choices that such an approach requires, and allow the unregulated flow of weapons from a 
wide array of self-interested parties, the Friends Group, with U.S. support, needs to develop 
strategies that recognize militarization as a reality to be managed, rather than imagining it as 
an outcome that can be avoided."95  
Even within Syria, responses to the conflict continue to call for more, not less 
militarization. Abdulnasser Al-Ayed, a former Syrian Air force office, recently proposed the 
idea of a national army to unite democratically oriented Syrians against ISIL and others that 
support extremist groups. "National democrats need a military force that fights against both 
the regime and extremist Islamist groups and preserves the security, freedoms and public 
rights of citizens. The members of this military force should be radically opposed to both of 
the other forces on principle i.e., they should have nationalist tendencies, be neutral with 
regard to religion, and must believe in political pluralism and be ready to protect it " (Al-
Ayed, 2015). This perspective reinforces the idea that although a political solution is 
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imperative, it is not seen as feasible in the current moment. “Sadly, the idea of a political 
solution in Syria is nonexistent in all parties and situations, due to military thrust. 
Reinforcing the opposition and training it for years indicate the lack of the political solution” 
(Haddad 2012). 
 
B. Increasing Sectarianism and Radicalization 
Another aspect of the Syrian conflict that has changed over time is the degree of 
sectarianism, measured by violent language and action aimed at particular religious groups. 
Before 2011, Syrian society was relatively cohesive and not as fractured along sectarian 
lines  as Lebanon or Iraq which have populations of similar religious compositions. While 
the uprising began in rural Sunni communities, “clearly defined Islamist motivations seem 
not to have been among the original underlying reasons for the unrest” (Hokayem 2013, 49). 
Instead, opposition activists tried to emphasize the religious diversity of the protests and 
their common concerns for civil and political rights and (Droz-Vincent 2014).  
Several scholars have noted the difference between the current uprising and the political 
confrontation with the Muslim Brotherhood that occurred in the late 1970s and had a 
stronger sectarian dimension (Pinto 2012). In that previous clash, the main adversaries to the 
regime were upper class urban elites and religious leaders who disapproved of the secular 
Baathist ideology. Since then, over the course of several decades of economic liberalization, 
there has been a small rapprochement between the regime and clergy while the rural poor 
who were formerly Baath allies felt marginalized and became the driving force behind the 
2011 protests (Pierret 2013). 
So the current conflict did not start out in opposition to the regime for religious reasons, 
although the majority of rural, working class Syrians are Sunni. However, elements of the 
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opposition soon became motivated by more sectarian and exclusive ideas. "The longer the 
conflict goes on, the more deeply entrenched the processes of sectarian radicalization 
become" (Ahmad 2013). According to Droz-Vincent, sectarian polarization didn't fully 
emerge until 2012-2013, and it can be seen mostly as a result of the fear that comes from 
violence and leads people to cling to their identities. "With the deepening of conflict, 
violence fuels fear and fear breeds self-closure and allegiance shifts towards sectarian 
alignments" (Droz-Vincent 2014, 53).  
As in the case of militarization, there is evidence that actions of the Assad regime 
directly contributed to growing sectarian divisions (Pinto 2012). The tactics used were 
similar to those used by his father in the 1970s including a very tough crackdown on 
protesters together with protection of Christian and Shia minorities. Some even go so far as 
to accuse Assad of deliberately fomenting a radical opposition by releasing Islamist 
prisoners in May 2011 (Drop-Vincent 2014). Munif theorizes that many Arab countries have 
used Islam to pacify the population while deliberately allowing radicalization to show that 
only the state can protect minorities (Munif 2014). 
However, the agendas of foreign powers communicated through financing and arms 
transfers also contributed to increased sectarianism. Saudi and other Gulf-based religious 
leaders began using sectarian language to voice support for the opposition as a purely Sunni 
movement. This can be seen as an extension of the rivalry for regional hegemony between 
the Gulf and what has been called the "Shia crescent". “The absence of a clear and credible 
opposition leadership in the early days of the uprising allowed media-savvy foreign-based 
and sometimes non-Syrian clerics to inject poisonous geopolitical and sectarian narratives 
that were partially corroborated by the regime’s response” (Hokayem 2013, 96). 
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As Gulf funding and weapons increased and Islamist militants grew more powerful, 
protest slogans became more religious, alienating minorities and reinforcing the sectarian 
agenda. "The religious nationalism became more and more clearly Sunni which made 
Christians and Alawis and others worried; they pulled back" (Pinto 2012). The spread of 
slogans against Iran and Hezbollah also created divisions within the protestors. Before 2011, 
there was only one Islamist militant organization in Syria, and it was neither jihadist nor 
Salafist. By 2013 Salafi Islamist groups were among the largest and strongest factions in the 
armed opposition. One such group, Ahrar al-Sham, "played a key role in transforming the 
anti-Assad revolt into an Islamist uprising. Its men fought alongside Jabhat al-Nusra, an al-
Qaeda affiliate, during the battle for Aleppo and they were accused of at least one sectarian 
massacre".96 As noted in the last chapter, Ahrar al-Sham was heavily supported by arms 
from Qatar. Competition for funds and arms has left fighters frustrated and some have even 
suggested that certain factions claim to be more religiously oriented than they are in order to 
secure Gulf patronage.97 
As the political agenda of the revolution began to disappear and be replaced by sectarian 
rhetoric, foreign fighters were drawn to the conflict as a cause to fight for. This was not the 
same cause initiated by the Syrian uprising, but one motivated by religious ideology 
(Hokayem 2013). George Ahmad uses the Arabic word "fitna" to describe the state of civil 
strife in Syria. "Fitna is fomented turmoil in which previously coexisting groups begin to 
fear and then kill each other as enemies " (Ahmad 2013, 52). On one side are Assad's 
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shabiha paramilitary forces, supplemented by Hezbollah and Iranian National Guard forces. 
On the other side are the more extreme groups within the Syrian opposition, including some 
associated with al-Qaeda.  Ahmad describes the more extreme groups as "Sunni foreign 
fighters and combatants from around the region driven by ideology rather than survival" 
(52). 
The following passage describes the experiences of one young Syrian who witnessed the 
sudden influx of foreign clerics to Aleppo beginning in 2012. With a combination of militant 
fundamentalism and ample financial backing, they played a significant role in recruiting 
locals to fighting brigades. 
“Mahmoud described to me how one Friday shortly after the rebels took over 
many of Aleppo’s southern and eastern neighborhoods in the summer of 2012, 
foreign-looking armed militants joined the congregation in his local mosque in 
Sha’ar in full combat gear with their rifles. As the imam stood up to give the sermon, 
one of them rushed forward and took his place on the pulpit and started giving his 
own fiery sermon, much to everyone’s surprise and shock. He even took his rifle up 
with him. They had never seen anything like this in their lives, as previously all 
mosques were tightly regulated by the Syrian regime and sermons were scrutinized 
and vetted to weed out anything subversive or critical of the status quo. 
 
..The radicalization did not stop at the pulpit, Mahmoud explained, and the 
jihadists were later superseded by radical clerics — proper ideological holy men who 
were better versed in Islamic scripture, more coherent and more capable of 
convincing the skeptics and would-be recruits of their fanatical interpretation of 
Islam. Many of them were foreign, from all sorts of nationalities, some spoke with a 
thick foreign accent and clearly did not look Arab, and were possibly from the 
Caucasus. 
 
…Mahmoud described to me his horror at what was going on. “I knew what they 
were doing, but I was helpless to stop it. We simply didn’t have the resources to take 
them on, they were well supplied and financed. We couldn’t provide all the aid they 
could, they must have spent millions.””98 
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C. Fragmentation and Protracted Conflict 
A third aspect of the conflict that is apparent in the transition to civil war is the 
fragmentation of rebel groups and the resulting stalemate between fighting forces. 
Fragmentation, or fracturing, refers to the division of anti-regime forces into smaller and 
smaller units that frequently end up fighting each other in addition to their common enemy. 
While political pundits may talk about the “Syrian opposition” as a singular entity, in reality 
there is no unified armed opposition. What started as neighborhood defense groups and 
army defectors has turned into over a thousand distinct insurgent units that continually 
morph into new groups, forming alliances of convenience and then breaking them again 
with no particular pattern (Lister 2014).  
 Fragmentation of rebel groups in civil wars is well documented and occurs for 
various reasons. In the case of Syria there are at least two ways in which arms transfers to 
the opposition have likely encouraged fighting between rebel groups. One of the most 
common causes of fragmentation is competition over resources, especially military 
resources and funding. Authors Fjelde and Nilsson stress that fighting among rebel groups in 
civil war should be understood as a means to secure resources and political standing. They 
also find evidence that “...groups that have received support from a foreign state have a 
higher likelihood of engaging in interrebel conflict” (Fjelde et al 2014, 605).  
In the case of Syria, competition between groups for small arms was enhanced by 
unreliable supply routes and the disjointed effort of foreign arms sponsors. The numerous 
donor countries each had their own preferences about which groups they wanted to support. 
For example, even in the beginning of the conflict, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey were all 
supplying different factions within the FSA, making it very difficult for the group to unify 
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(Munif 2014). The division was even more pronounced when the FSA set up its own 
“Syrian Support Group” in 2012 to receive and distribute weapons as a way to bypass the 
Brotherhood-dominated SNC. Saudi Arabia became the main supporter of this new group 
while Qatar and Turkey continued to work with the SNC (Ostovar et al. 2013). 
These supply patterns encouraged fragmentation by forcing fighters to migrate to groups 
that had better connections to foreign sponsors at any given time. “Qatar and other 
international powers haphazardly backed dozens of different brigades and let them fight it 
out for who could secure a greater share of the funding”.99  The rivalry between Saudi 
Arabia and Qatar not only led to direct competition between groups that they funded; it also 
led many factions to search elsewhere for support through private networks and black 
markets which created further divisions (The Carter Center, 2014). 
The second way that arms transfers may have encouraged fragmentation is through 
acquisition patterns. One case study in Nigeria confirmed that the method of arms 
acquisition is an important factor in interrebel relations (Duquet 2009). Duquet found that as 
different group leaders were able to independently acquire arms, the likelihood of unity 
between the insurgency as a whole decreased. “As the leaders of different rival groups had 
control over their own acquisition patterns, this contributed to the obstruction of a unified 
insurgency against the Nigerian state” (Duquet 2009, 182). Moore (2012) concurs that if 
individual soldiers are able to acquire major weapons such as missiles, the group is likely to 
become fragmented.  
At least some of the arms transfer schemes devolved into this kind of distribution by 
2013. The Wall Street Journal writes this about the U.S. operations center in Turkey: 
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“Because U.S. officials concluded that the moderate opposition Free Syrian Army wasn’t 
able to safeguard U.S. supplies in Syria, the CIA decided to deliver weapons directly to the 
trusted commanders. Some military officials warned that the CIA risked creating warlords 
and undermining cohesion in the ranks of local fighters, but the CIA saw no credible 
alternative”.100 By providing arms (including anti-tank missiles) to individual commanders, 
the U.S. has also contributed to fragmentation of rebel groups. 
Fragmentation may have some intrinsically negative effects, but it is also connected to 
increased duration of the war. It is clear from looking at the conflict that the infighting and 
lack of unity between rebels has made it more difficult for the political opposition to 
challenge the regime and to negotiate at the Geneva II Conference. While there isn’t yet 
enough research connecting the phenomenon of fragmentation with conflict duration, it has 
been well established that third party interventions in civil wars can lead to prolonged 
conflict. Regan (2002) defines military support as “equipment, intelligence, sanctions, or 
advisors”, all of which are present in Syria. Transfer of weapons is one method of foreign 
military intervention, and in this case it has increased the duration of the conflict through 
creation of a stalemate, negotiation challenges, and escalation of violence. 
 
Stalemate 
“The conflict in Syria contains countless fronts and dozens, if not hundreds, of 
localized theaters of battle. Taken together, neither the opposition, the Assad regime, the 
Kurds, nor the jihadis can be said to be ‘winning’” (Lister 2014).   
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The stalemate has come about in part because the weapons and other support provided to 
the rebels has been matched or equalled by support given to the regime. The willingness of 
external actors to continue providing a certain level of support to each side has allowed the 
conflict to keep simmering without hope for any military victory. Politically, blame has been 
placed either on Iran for supporting the regime or the U.S. for insufficiently supporting the 
opposition. Rather than highlighting the role of one actor, it is important to look at the entire 
network of third parties that are contributing to this situation. 
Looking at 152 civil wars in the 19th and 20th centuries, Balch-Lindsay et al. find that 
“The more equitable the distribution of third party interventions across the domestic sides in 
a civil war, the longer the duration of the civil war” (Balch-Lindsay et al. 2000, 625). The 
distribution of arms in Syria could be considered “equitable” or neutral because there are 
actors on both sides intervening by contributing military support and neither side has been 
able to tip the scale. Balch-Lindsay et al. also emphasize the importance at looking at the 
geopolitical context of intervening actors and even suggest that some states may have 
incentives to prolong the conflict. “While some third parties might prefer to end civil wars 
rapidly for humanitarian reasons, other third parties might prefer to prolong the duration of 
civil wars with an eye toward plundering the natural resources of the civil war state, or 
draining the resources of a rival third party, for example” (Balch-Lindsay et al. 2000, 637). 
This reflects the attitude of many Syrians that the U.S. in particular is intentionally 
prolonging the conflict. The FSA general secretary Ammar al-Wawi remarked: “The U.S. 
provides just enough [weapons] to keep the fighting going, but not enough to win” 
(Democratic Revolution, 2014). Another fighter that received U.S. training at a camp in 
Jordan goes further to say that “America is benefiting from the destruction and the killing in 
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order to weaken both sides”.101 Even an American analyst, Joshua Landis, admits that “the 
US is playing a ‘rather mischievous role’ by supporting the rebels with one hand and 
restraining them with the other. ‘The result is that we’re prolonging the rebellion, but we’re 
also making sure it can’t win’.102 
 Despite the focus on the individual contributions of each actor, the cumulative 
impact of arms flowing into the country to all sides and funding by varying political interests 
is what allows the war to continue. "In an open system fueled surreptitiously by numerous 
outside parties following different interested logics, chaos can be perpetuated for a long 
time" (Ahmad 2013, 52). Unfortunately, if nothing changes, there is the potential for the 
situation to remain as it is for some time. A former CIA analyst was quoted as saying: “Both 
sides' external allies... are ready to supply enough money and arms to fuel the stalemate for 
the foreseeable future”.103 
 
Negotiation Challenges 
A second way that third party interventions can increase the duration of a conflict is by 
making it harder for a successful negotiation to take place. While intervening in an intrastate 
conflict is usually done with the stated purpose of ending the violence, it has become clear 
that “most interventions appear to prolong rather than reduce the expected duration of a 
conflict” (Regan 2002, 56). Regan also finds that if an intervention brings the capabilities of 
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each party closer to equal, it would encourage each to keep fighting and they would be less 
willing to negotiate. Even though the intervention in Syria has been piecemeal and small 
scale, it did increase the opposition’s expectations of further support, which “would lead the 
rebel leadership to press for greater demands and be more resolute in their decision to fight” 
(Regan 2002, 61).  
Conflicts with intervention by independent actors, as opposed to multilateral 
organizations, are harder to resolve because each actor that becomes involved then has a 
stake in the settlement (Cunningham 2010). External actors are less likely to negotiate right 
away because they have fewer costs in continuing the fight than internal participants. When 
a foreign actor intervenes to pursue their own agenda, Cunningham suggests "it makes sense 
to treat it as a separate combatant who must either be defeated militarily or satisfied through 
some sort of agreement for the war to end" (117). The more combatants involved in a war, 
the harder it would be to come to a resolution. In the case of Syria there is no international 
organization involved that would be able to unify the agendas of all the intervening states. 
“When external states intervene in conflicts to pursue a separate agenda, the conflict will be 
harder to resolve and therefore longer” (Cunningham 2010, 119). 
Continuing the focus on interveners as independent, unilateral actors, Aydin et al. find 
that when intervening states are competing for influence over combatants (as Saudi Arabia 
and Qatar have), they prolong the fighting. “Third-party states bandwagoning on the same 
side of a civil war are effective in stopping the fighting only when the intervening parties 
share similar preferences" (Aydin et al. 2012, 573). Moreover, unilateral interventions 
should not be analyzed as independent, discrete events but as a complex process with 
cumulative impacts on the conflict. These authors call for intervening states to cooperate and 
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make sure that their relationships are not "contributing to the struggles of people in civil war 
countries" (Aydin et al. 2012, 591). 
Cunningham also emphasizes that states do not always intervene on behalf of the 
fighting parties, or with the same goals and intentions, even though they may profess to do 
so. Unfortunately, distinguishing real from stated goals of intervening actors can be quite 
difficult, especially when human rights language is used to mask geopolitical agendas. 
Sadly, intervening states may be given a political “green light” from the international 
community even when the results of their actions fail to match up with declared intentions. 
“Altruistic statements are commonly greeted with skepticism and with reminders that acts 
speak louder than words. Yet in public life, words often manage to outweigh acts” 
(Bricmont 2007, 30). 
 
Escalation of Violence 
Finally, duration of civil conflicts is increased simply through the escalation of violence, 
which is encouraged by the supply of arms. Moore (2012) finds that rebel groups’ access to 
major conventional weapons (usually shoulder launched surface to air or anti-armor 
missiles) increases the duration and severity of intrastate conflicts. It is often assumed that 
rebels acquire most of their larger arms by stealing from the government, but research has 
shown that looted weapons are often not integrated into the conflict due to lack of training 
and missing parts. Large arms through international transfer are required for rebel groups to 
successfully challenge the government, but this often leads to an arms race, escalation and 
more bloodshed. "Although arming either side should increase conflict severity, we should 
expect weapons transferred to rebels to have a greater likelihood of increasing the severity 
of conflict than those weapons transferred to states" (Moore 2012, 334).  
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The above sections should make clear that arming rebels in a civil conflict only creates 
more violence and is not likely to end the conflict sooner. Rather, as seen in the case of 
Syria, the diverse agendas of the many states pouring weapons into the country has been a 
major factor contributing to militarization, sectarianism, and protracted fighting.  
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III. Chapter Three: Small Arms Control in Civil Wars 
In the previous chapters I have described the patterns of small arms transfers into Syria 
and discussed the potential negative impacts they have had on the conflict since 2011. If it is 
true that pouring weapons into a conflict zone will lead to an increased level and duration of 
violence, then what can be done to prevent that from happening? This chapter will look at 
two state-centered methods that are currently being used to control the spread of small arms: 
embargoes and treaties.  
Embargoes against weapons exports or imports are one form of sanctions that have 
become more common in the past few decades. Typically directed against an offending state 
government, they can be unilateral or multilateral, and partial or impartial. While most 
embargoes are meant to be impartial, they often do not explicitly state the prohibition of 
transferring arms to non-governmental parties. The language of these policies can be very 
ambiguous and it is not always clear if the embargo applies to the state as a territory or as a 
governing entity.  
The effectiveness of embargoes is contested at best, in part because compliance relies on 
exporting states themselves, which may have strategic interests in continuing the supply of 
arms to either party. States are very rarely neutral in relation to an intrastate conflict and 
usually would prefer an embargo on one side and not the other. In the case of Syria, the 
embargoes that were implemented were all effectively partial although they were not 
explicitly worded in that way. A second reason that embargoes may not be effective is that 
they are used as an inexpensive policy that gives the appearance of action. The government 
or organization implementing an arms embargo may not be able to enforce it, but it gives the 
illusion of doing something concrete, which is politically convenient. 
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A. UN Arms Embargoes 
The most inclusive type of multilateral arms embargo would be issued through the UN 
Security Council. The first UN arms embargo was declared in 1948 during the Arab Israeli 
war, but the use of embargoes in civil war has increased dramatically since 1990 (Tierney 
2005). Today they are the most common form of sanctions imposed by the UN. 
In 2011, then U.S. ambassador to the United Nations Susan Rice affirmed “the need for 
tough, targeted sanctions and an arms embargo to protect the population” in Syria.104 In 
April 2013, the UN envoy to Syria “suggested the Security Council consider an arms 
embargo on both sides of Syria's conflict”105 and UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon has 
repeatedly requested an embargo of weapons into the country, saying most recently "It is 
essential to stem the flow of arms pouring into the country. It is irresponsible for foreign 
powers and groups to give continued military support to parties in Syria that are committing 
atrocities”.106 
Despite the public pleas for applying such a ban, the UN Security Council has been 
unable to pass any resolution that would set the stage for possible sanctions against Syria, 
including an arms embargo. Three successive attempts at such a resolution failed due to the 
vetoes of permanent Security Council members Russia and China.  
In October 2011, the first resolution that would have threatened sanctions against Syria 
failed- China and Russia veto. In February of 2012 a second resolution that would have 
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demanded a halt in violence by all parties was also rejected by the two countries.107 Finally 
in July of that year a third resolution was vetoed that "would have threatened sanctions on 
the country if demands to end the spiraling violence were not met”.108 
The reason for this persistent failure is partly linked to the implementation of a previous 
UN resolution concerning Libya. In 2011 the Russian representative Vitaly Churkin “was 
alarmed that compliance with Security Council resolutions in Libya had been considered a 
model for future actions by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization”.109  
Churkin was referring to Resolution 1970, which imposed, among other sanctions, an 
arms embargo against imported and exported weapons in Libya. While the terms of this 
resolution were clear, the following resolution 1973 made the arms embargo ambiguous by 
authorizing “all necessary measures” to protect civilians.110 
France soon began openly providing arms to the rebels in Libya, which they believed 
was in the scope of the UN mandate. The US State Department agreed, asserting: "We 
believe that UN Security Council resolutions 1970 and 1973, read together, neither specified 
nor precluded providing defense materiel to the Libyan opposition”.111  
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Russia on the other hand strongly disagreed with this assessment, believing that the 
terms of the UN Security Council resolutions were clearly exceeded by NATO. "This 
expanded mission was bitterly criticized by Russia and China, which had reluctantly 
acquiesced in Resolution 1973 on the basis of its allegedly limited mandate. Their 
opposition to the scope of the NATO intervention later became a basis for resisting coercive 
resolutions by the Council against Syria.” (Bali et al 2012, 119). 
Russia is not the only one to maintain that the arms embargo should have applied to all 
parties in Libya, not only the regime. Corten and Koutoulisy come to the conclusion that 
military support to the rebels was not covered by either Security Council resolution (Corten 
and Koutoulisy 2013). Evans agrees that there was at least a widespread perception that 
NATO had abused the UN mandate in Libya by "comprehensively supporting the rebel side 
in what rapidly became a civil war, ignoring the very explicit arms embargo in the process” 
(Evans 2014, 20). In this case it comes down to whether the arms supplied to the rebels were 
intended to overthrow the regime or solely for the protection of civilians. The perception 
among BRICS countries was the former, and there is “no general rule of international law 
that allows a State to support rebels in overthrowing a government, even if this government 
is responsible for gross human rights violations” (Corten and Koutoulisy 2013, 64). 
However, it was also possible for France and others to use the mantle of the “Responsibility 
to Protect” to justify their actions.  
It is clear that regardless of who is more in line with international law, the result of the 
actions in Libya made it impossible for an arms embargo against Syria to be implemented. It 
has also been well documented by a UN committee that the embargo against Libyan arms 
exports has been violated many times, leading to the proliferation of weapons throughout 
northern Africa and even to Syria (see chapter 2). 
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Embargo against al-Qaeda 
It should be noted that although there is not a specific UN embargo against sending arms 
into the territory of Syria, there does remain an embargo against al-Qaeda and Associated 
Individuals and Entities, which is not limited to the territory of a particular UN member 
(Holtom 2012). The embargo prevents the “direct or indirect supply, sale, or transfer to these 
individuals, groups, undertakings and entities...of arms and related materiel of all types 
including weapons and ammunition” (Security Council 2011). The UN Security Council has 
explicitly affirmed that both ISIL and the militant group Jabhat al-Nusra are offshoots of al-
Qaeda and therefore included in the sanctions list.112 It has been pointed out that there is a 
high probability that some of the arms distributed to “moderate” Syrian rebels will 
inadvertently end up in the hands of one of these two groups. “In particular, because 
Resolution 2083 bans indirect supply of arms, due care would have to be taken to ensure that 
arms transferred to the Supreme Military Council did not find their way to al-Qaeda 
affiliated groups” (Schmitt 2014, 139). If it could be proven that this is indeed happening, it 
would be difficult to argue that the transfers did not constitute “indirect supply” and thus a 
violation of the embargo. 
 
B. Other Multilateral Embargoes 
There have been two instances of multilateral arms embargoes against Syria since 2011, 
but both were effectively repealed in 2013. The first was issued by the European Union as 
part of a package of sanctions against the Syrian government in May 2011. The Council 
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Decision 2011/273/CFSP and Council Regulation No 442/2011 included a full embargo on 
the supply of arms and military equipment to Syria (SIPRI 2013). The embargo was lifted in 
May 2013 due largely to pressure from British and French leaders, who both wanted the 
option to begin arming the Syrian moderate opposition.113 It was recently revealed in a 
forthcoming book that France knowingly directed arms to Syrian rebels while the EU 
embargo was in effect. “According to Hollande, as cited by Panon, France delivered 
cannons, machine guns, rocket launchers and anti-tank missiles to the forces fighting Bashar 
Al-Assad in the protracted Syrian civil war. Earlier, Hollande maintained France only sent 
weapons to Syria after the embargo was lifted”.114 
 While it only lasted for 2 years, the EU embargo should have covered at least some 
of the suppliers of small arms to fighters in Syria. It is not likely that any EU members states 
would have supplied the Syrian government, but several Eastern European countries have 
been reported as sources for rebel groups. In chapter two I discussed several news reports 
related to Croatian and Yugoslavian arms being sent by Qatar and Saudi Arabia. These 
reports didn’t appear until after 2013, so it is unclear whether they broke the embargo. In a 
2014 Small Arms Survey report, Romania, Ukraine and the Czech Republic are listed as 
primary suppliers of ammunition that have been found in Syria during the war (Jenzen-Jones 
2014). While Ukraine is not a member of the EU, the other two are and would have been 
required to adhere to the embargo. However, as the authors of that report acknowledge, it is 
impossible to know when the ammunition was transferred to Syria, or if it was the result of a 
direct or indirect sale.  
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 The second multilateral embargo of arms against Syria was drafted by the Arab 
League. In November 2011 the 22-member group voted to suspend Syria’s membership and 
impose sanctions. The next month they issued a clarifying statement that included the line 
"Ban the supply of all kinds of weapons to Syria from the Arab states” (SIPRI 2012). As in 
the case of the EU, this embargo lasted only until early 2013 when the league issued a 
statement stressing "the right of each state, according to its wishes, to offer all types of self-
defence, including military, to support the resilience of the Syrian people and the Free 
[Syrian] Army”.115 Even while the embargo was in effect, it was either understood only as a 
partial embargo against the Syrian regime, or it was flagrantly violated by several Arab 
League members who began organizing shipments of weapons to opposition groups in 2012. 
 There have also been several unilateral arms embargoes against Syria, including 
Canada, Australia and Turkey. The case of Turkey is most interesting in light of the 
significance of their border for smuggling arms. They imposed an arms embargo as part of a 
larger package of sanctions in September 2011, and they soon began intercepting ships 
headed to Syria from Iran and Russia.116 It is unclear whether the sanction was meant to be 
partial, but by 2013 Turkey was among the countries calling for the removal of the EU 
embargo, saying that “The embargo had correspondingly strengthened President Bashar al-
Assad’s forces, which continue to receive weapons from Russia and Iran and never 
depended on EU countries in any case”.117 Turkey has been accused of deliberately allowing 
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weapons shipments across its borders to reach rebel groups in Syria, although they maintain 
an attitude of denial. 
 
C. Challenges for Embargoes 
While the main obstacle in Syria has been in acquiring the political will to declare 
embargoes, those that have been implemented have had relatively little effect. Countries that 
wanted to supply the rebel groups with arms either ignored the embargoes or found ways 
around them, while those that continued to arm the Syrian government were not party to any 
multilateral embargoes and simply continued business as usual, with the occasional 
exception of Turkish interception. 
Even if there had been a UN embargo against Syria, would it have been successful in 
reducing the volume of arms entering the country? Much of the literature tends to say no. 
Tierney concludes that "Virtually every case of a UN arms embargo applied to a civil war 
has been a failure (Tierney 2005, 61). 
There are a few recent studies that are more optimistic. Brzoska analyses 74 cases of 
arms embargoes and finds that contrary to popular belief, 40% of them have actually had 
success in reducing the volume of arms reaching the target. He also finds that multilateral 
embargoes are more likely to be effective than unilateral ones (Brzoska 2008). Erickson 
comes to a similar conclusion in her study, saying that "Major exporters overall appear to 
implement sanctions, despite strong economic incentives to ignore them and a lack of formal 
accountability mechanisms to punish violators” (Erickson 2013, 159).  
Notwithstanding these more hopeful findings, it remains true that weapons embargoes 
are extremely difficult to implement, especially when it comes to small arms. Even if an 
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embargo has partial success, there are many factors that make it problematic as an arms 
control policy. 
First, there is the issue of black market prices. By decreasing the legal supply of 
weapons, the price of illegal weapons goes up, creating potentially large profits for those 
willing to operate on the black market. In Bosnia for example, "the existence of an embargo 
merely raised the price, making it 'three or four times higher' than if openly available” 
(Pythian 2000, 37). Phythian even goes so far as to say that the illicit arms trade is a product 
of the Cold War because of the numerous export embargoes that were applied to states for 
foreign policy reasons. Arms trafficking is a lucrative business, and can create a kind of 
dependency for a plethora of sub-state actors that are involved in the supply chain. Corrupt 
military officials, rebel leaders, brokers, and transporters, are just some of the figures that 
profit from the movement of weapons. “It is at the local and regional level and in the war 
zones that the economic addiction to weapons trafficking needs to be addressed—not just in 
the capitals of the major arms-supplying nations.” (Hartung 2015, 93). 
Secondly, there is the general problem of enforcement. When it comes to state 
enforcement of arms exports, strong national laws and government structures are essential. 
However, in many cases the states neighboring conflict zones may themselves be very weak 
and lack the resources to effectively monitor arms transactions. In addition, those that are in 
a position to regulate are often profiting from illicit trade themselves, creating perverse 
incentives (Phythian 2000).  
Aside from regulatory issues, states may have strategic interests at the highest political 
levels that keep them from fully complying with an embargo. This may range from simply 
not enforcing export rules to willfully breaking them. In Bosnia, the full embargo on all of 
Yugoslavia was rendered almost meaningless as many states continued supplying arms to 
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the area. Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Pakistan and Iran were among the suppliers, the latter of 
which was approved by the United States (Bourne 2010). According to Phythian, the CIA 
even encouraged companies to export to South Africa during a UN embargo on that country 
in the 1980s (Phythian 2000). 
Compliance in the case of a multilateral embargo may be even more difficult to obtain 
because the regulatory responsibility still essentially lies with the state body. Multilateral 
sanctions committees that monitor enforcement rely on member states to provide 
information and are frequently under-resourced and understaffed (Tierney 2005).  While 
legal government-to-government transfers are usually trackable, those to non-state actors are 
seldom reported by government sources (Dhanapala et al, 1999). If the multilateral agency is 
not informed it is nearly impossible for it to enforce an embargo, and if one crucial state 
lacks the will or capacity to comply, the entire embargo could be ineffectual (Tierney 2005).  
Thirdly, the question of who the embargo should apply to is deeply related to its 
potential effectiveness. The question of neutrality comes into play: is it best to prevent arms 
from reaching every party in a civil war? Or should the relative strength and human rights 
abuses of each be taken into consideration? Some suggest that impartial embargoes can be 
more harmful than helpful because non-state groups are likely to be more disadvantaged 
than government actors (Tierney 2005). In either case, clarity of language in reference to the 
targets of an embargo is essential. As in the example of Libya, disagreements about the 
interpretation of resolutions could lead each state to pursue its own national interests and 
justify its actions accordingly.  
A final problem with embargoes lies not in their enforcement but in their timing. Most 
often by the time the international community is aware of a conflict and the political will to 
declare an embargo is present, arms have already been collected by the parties that would be 
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most impacted by an embargo. For example, the government of Syria already had a large 
cache of weapons stored since Cold War years and may not have been deterred by a full UN 
embargo even if that had been achieved. The surest way to prevent or reduce violent conflict 
would be to prevent the groups involved from stockpiling arms in the first place. 
Unfortunately, major global arms producers have a habit of excessively arming their allies 
during peaceful times. "There is not a single case where an arms embargo was introduced 
sufficiently early to prevent the aggressor faction from actually initiating civil war. 
Therefore, by the time embargoes are introduced, many of the combatants are armed to the 
teeth” (Tierney 2005).  
 
D. The Arms Trade Treaty 
Small arms control as an international problem didn’t receive considerable attention until 
the late 1990s. Prior to that the focus was on conventional heavy weapons, but the campaign 
to ban landmines and the resulting treaty in 1997 brought small arms to the fore. With the 
end of the cold war and the surpluses of weapons that were suddenly made available on the 
black or legal market, SALW became the primary weapons used in 90% of armed conflicts 
since 1990 (Bourne 2010) . The increasing prevalence of ethnic violence and civil war, from 
Rwanda to Bosnia, helped to make small arms proliferation a human rights issue. 
The first major effort to address this problem on a global scale was the 2001 UN 
Programme of Action (PoA), which included strategies to regulate import and export 
controls, stockpile management, and weapons collection and disposal. While the PoA was a 
huge step in the right direction and all UN member states eventually joined it, it was strictly 
voluntary with no enforcement mechanisms. The PoA was also focused solely on illicit arms 
trade and did not include any controls on legal transfers (Meyer 2014).  
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The first legally binding agreement, adopted by the UN General Assembly in 2001, was 
the Firearms Protocol, which has significant limitations in scope. It covers only firearms and 
ammunition, and “...does not apply to state-to-state transactions or state transfers where 
national security interests would be prejudiced” (Parker 2013, 2). Like the PoA, the focus 
was clearly on trying to curb illegal arms transfers, but as Mike Bourne has pointed out, “the 
primary global structure of SALW spread...is the legal market not a global illicit market” 
(Bourne 2010, 10).  
In 2008 the UN General Assembly authorized the establishment of a working group 
towards a legally binding international Arms Trade Treaty (ATT).  After a several years of 
negotiations and a few failed attempts, the treaty finally passed in April 2013 and entered 
into force after the first 50 ratifications, in December 2014 (Meyer 2014). The ATT is 
significant is several ways. It is the first legally binding arms treaty that is both 
comprehensive in scope and has a global reach (Garcia 2014). It is also different from the 
PoA and the Firearms Protocol in that it is meant to regulate government authorized, state-
to-state trade.  
There are two ways of controlling arms exports in the ATT. First, there are specific 
prohibitions against states under arms embargoes, and those that have violated international 
agreements regarding illegal trafficking (Meyer 2014). In addition there is a risk assessment 
requirement for all arms exports, even if the receiving state is not under prohibition. The risk 
assessment should take into account “whether the arms would contribute to undermining 
peace and security, or could be used to commit or facilitate serious violations of 
international humanitarian or human rights law” (Meyer 2014, 207). If the supplier has prior 
knowledge that genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity or others covered by the 
Geneva Conventions will occur, they are prohibited from transferring the weapons.  
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The ATT covers all conventional weapons and ammunition including SALW, which fills 
some gaps from previous agreements, but it only deals with international transfers. There are 
still certain munitions, parts and components that are not covered, but in general the scope of 
weapons covered is broad (McDonald 2013). Regarding exports, the ATT has strengthened 
regulations, but in terms of import, transit and brokering, it has weakened existing 
commitments. Furthermore, disarmament, stockpile management, surplus disposal and other 
topics are not covered at all (Parker 2013). 
 
State Responsibility 
While the treaty is at least an important symbolic achievement, there are several 
obstacles that make it unlikely that the ATT will have a meaningful impact on conflicts like 
the Syrian Civil War. For one thing, even though the treaty is legally binding, it still relies 
solely on signatory states for its enforcement. “The Treaty is not self-implementing but will 
necessitate that states pass national laws to carry out the obligations arising from the 
Treaty’s norms” (Garcia 2014).  
Even the language of the treaty is full of ambiguous statements that tend to leave the 
most important decisions up to states. For example, the result of a risk assessment would 
only prevent export authorization if the state determines there is an “overriding risk of any 
of the negative consequences” (Arms Trade Treaty 2013, Art. 7). If the state fails to find that 
overriding risk, and has no prior knowledge that human rights violations will occur with the 
weapons it exports, then it cannot be held responsible for the consequences (Clapham 2014). 
This brings up important questions about how to calculate risk, which are essentially left up 
to the state to decide. 
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The provisions that cover import and transit are also “ littered with qualifying language, 
whereby states are only required to take measures to regulate imports ‘where necessary’ (art. 
8.2); to take measures to regulate transit ‘where necessary and feasible’ (art.9)" (Parker 
2013, 2). Article 11 of the ATT addresses the issue of diversion, which is one way that 
legally transferred small arms enter the black market. Unfortunately, this provision “puts 
almost all responsibility for preventing diversion on the exporting state, playing down the 
contribution that importing states need to make in this area” (McDonald  2013). Requiring 
authorization for all re-exports or transfers would be one way of preventing exporting states 
from inadvertently arming groups they have no connection with. For example, Germany has 
signed and ratified the ATT, and has no intention of sending arms to either side in Syria. 
Chancellor Merkel has stated “On the issue of arms supplies, Germany has very clear, strict 
rules on this, legal rules, according to which we are not allowed to supply arms into areas 
where there is civil strife.  And that is not specifically designed for the Syrian question; it is 
a general rule” (The White House, 2013). However, Germany continues to export arms to 
Saudi Arabia and other states that could potentially divert the arms to conflicts.118 
 
Ratifications 
Secondly, and related to the first problem, states can only be held responsible for the 
treaty agreements if they have signed and ratified it. As of April 2015, 130 states have 
signed the ATT, but only 66 have ratified it. None of the states involved in the Syrian 
conflict are included in that number (UNODA 2015). Iran, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Jordan 
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have not even become signatories. Turkey, the U.S., Lebanon and Libya have signed but not 
ratified the treaty.  
Hypothetically, selling arms to the Assad regime would now be in violation of the Arms 
Trade Treaty, under Article 6. "A State Party shall not authorize any transfer...[that] would 
be used in the commission of genocide, crimes against humanity, grave breaches of the 
Geneva Conventions of 1949, attacks directed against civilians...or other war crimes” (Arms 
Trade Treaty 2013, Art. 6.3). It could be argued at least that the Syrian government has been 
involved in attacks directed against civilians, using weapons provided to it by both Russia 
and Iran. Without those two countries signing the treaty, there is no action that could be 
taken to prevent them from continuing to supply the Assad regime. 
This problem is not unique to the Syrian war. Of the top ten exporting countries (from 
2009 - 2013), only the five European Union countries have ratified the treaty.119 The United 
States, Russia, China, Ukraine and Israel are unlikely to become parties to the ATT. 
Likewise; out of the top ten importing countries only Australia has succeeded in ratifying 
the treaty.120  Unless these important players in the global arms trade find strong incentives 
to join the ATT, the treaty will fail to achieve its intended results. 
 
Non-state Actors 
By far the most problematic aspect of the ATT as it concerns intrastate conflict is the 
lack focus on non-state actors. In civil conflict, at least one party will be a non-state actor, 
and these armed groups frequently have external state sponsors. SALW are particularly easy 
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for non-state actors to acquire because of the large supply base and because they can be 
technically assimilated easily (Bourne 2010). Despite this, there is no blanket prohibition on 
transfers to non-state actors in the ATT. 
This has been one of the most contentious issues in the ATT process, primarily because 
of strong resistance from the U.S. (Garcia 2014). “The US position on the issue of banning 
arms transfers to non-state actors showed that US state security concerns would be 
accommodated even when they were in conflict with the state security concerns of many 
states around the world” (Bromley et al. 2012, 1030). 
There have been past efforts to ban transfers to non-state actors, for example in the PoA 
discussed above. There was a provision in that agreement which stated, “Exporting countries 
will supply small arms only to governments, either directly or through entities authorized to 
procure arms on behalf of governments” (Holtom 2012). The United States objected to that 
restriction as well, stating: "This proposal would preclude assistance to an oppressed non-
state group defending itself from a genocidal government. Distinctions between 
governments and non-governments are irrelevant in determining responsible and 
irresponsible end-users of arms. " (Holtom 2012). 
The primary reason for the U.S. objection to this potential ban has always been 
constraints on national security and foreign policy interests (Holtom 2012). As Stohl et al. 
point out, the U.S. occasionally arms rebel groups as part of their foreign policy.“ 
 Immediately after the [9/11] attacks, Secretary of State Colin Powell stated that the United 
States would provide arms to groups such as the Afghan Northern Alliance and Iraqi 
opposition groups” (Stohl et al. 2007, 48). 
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During the cold war that was a common strategy used by both sides, but even in the past 
decade the U.S. and others have continued the practice. Libya, Syria, and now possibly 
Ukraine provide cogent examples.121 It’s clear from their absence on the list of signatory 
states that many Gulf countries were also “unlikely to support the inclusion of a prohibition 
on transfers to NSA in an ATT" (Holtom 2012). 
An additional reason that the ban on transfers of SALW was not included in the ATT is 
that there is still no internationally accepted definition of a non-state actor (Holtom 2012). 
For example, should private military contractors be counted as non-state even when they are 
doing the bidding of a state government? What about non-UN member states or 
unrecognized governments? The line between state and non-state military actions is 
becoming blurrier, especially as states like the U.S. continue training and arming militias. It 
is well known that governments use the same arms brokers and networks for legal transfers 
as others do for illegal transfers (Stohl et al. 2007).  
In SALW literature, some of those covert arms transfers might be labeled ‘grey market’, 
which account for a larger volume and value of trade than black market, especially to 
conflict areas (Bourne 2010). Grey market arms transfers refer to those that fall somewhere 
between legal and illegal. An example would be a transfer from a state or agency in 
violation of its own laws to a conflict group, or a transfer that is authorized by one state and 
not the other. Sometimes it is not clear if a transaction is authorized by the state or not. 
“Grey-market transhipment occurs when the authorisation of the state is unclear, often 
involving state officials acting in an official capacity but without appropriate authorisation” 
(Bourne 2010, 126). 
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Even though there is no blanket prohibition on transfers to non-state actors, the U.S. and 
other relevant states listed above are not likely to ratify the ATT. Perhaps one factor is that 
an honest risk assessment as described in Article 7 would lead to the conclusion that arms 
transfers to opposition groups could have negative results. How could it be concluded that 
sending more arms to a conflict zone would not risk “undermining peace and security” 
(Arms Trade Treaty 2013)?  
One last reason there may never be a ban on transfers to non-state actors is that it is 
impossibly difficult to track them. There is no database for transfers beyond the state-to-
state zone, and once weapons make their way into the illicit or gray market realm, they 
disappear from public record. Treaties and embargoes are important but top-down solutions 
can only go so far in dealing with transnational problems. There is a need for non-state-
centered arms control, focused directly on the source: major arms producers and economies 
that rely on them, as well as areas where arms have already accumulated and are waiting to 
be funneled to the next big conflict.  
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IV. Chapter Four: Surplus Arms and Disarmament 
Moving beyond the matter of embargo and treaty compliance, the broader issue of arms 
production needs to be addressed. The biggest problem with treaties and other norms for 
international trade is that they no longer call for disarmament but rather accept militarism as 
a legitimate aim. If real progress is to be achieved in curbing SALW proliferation, 
“campaigners need to return to a strategic contestation of global militarism rather than 
searching for tactical campaign victories dependent on accommodation with the language 
and economic and security paradigms of contemporary military humanism” (Cooper 2011, 
154).  
With arms control regulations, the international community is attempting to direct how 
and where weapons are distributed, but ultimately these laws have failed to keep arms out of 
conflict zones and high tension areas. Meanwhile, there is no attempt to slow production of 
arms or the growth of the industry itself. Without infringing on the legal right of states to 
defend themselves and store weapons for that purpose, there is still much that can be said 
about the impact of arms production and the sheer quantity of weapons available all over the 
world.  
Thousands of new weapons are continually produced by the global defense industry, 
year after year. The Small Arms Survey estimates “an annual production of small arms alone 
(firearms, rather than light weapons) averaging 700,000—900,000” worldwide.122 This is 
added to the 875 million estimated to already exist.123 Weapons producers, like any private 
business, are profit-driven and their survival depends on selling new lethal equipment each 
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year. In order to keep sales up, they also need to continue making their old products 
obsolete. It's the same logic that tech companies use when creating new cell phone and 
computer models every year that are always more attractive and innovative than the previous 
ones. The health of the defense industry also requires consumer led growth and the creation 
of new products to replace the old. But unlike many of today’s cheap consumer products 
that seem built to fall apart, rifles and handguns are made to last. 
Just because new weapons are produced doesn’t mean that the old ones become 
inoperable. What happens to last year’s weapons? Just as you may sell your old laptop on 
Ebay or your used car to a dealer, old weapons are sold on the global market to those that 
can't afford brand new models. This is the fate of what are called ‘surplus’ arms, the 
weapons that are available to circulate freely in the licit or illicit market because they are 
made extraneous to the needs of governments that have acquired them. The availability of 
surplus weapons has enormous implications for intrastate conflicts such as Syria as this is 
what makes it possible to ship cheap supplies of guns and ammunition to insurgent groups. 
There are two interconnected processes that lead to the availability of surplus arms: 
continuous production that renders old models obsolete, and the failure to collect, secure, 
and destroy excess weapons, wherever they exist. The first process can be described as a 
perpetual generation of surplus stocks by categorizing weapons as out-of-date (Bourne 
2010). "As a modern military force either accumulates far more small arms than it needs or 
updates and replaces its obsolete models, its government passes much of its old stock on to 
the global arms market” (Chivers 2011). The end of the Cold War contributed greatly to this 
global surplus, bringing an unprecedented scale of surplus weapons to the market (Byman et 
al. 2001). Former Soviet countries no longer needed such large arsenals, and economic 
decline made them eager to sell surplus stocks wherever possible. The practice of 
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standardizing military equipment with allies also renders nonstandard equipment useless, 
unless it can be converted to cash. Mike Bourne estimates that the number of SALW made 
surplus after the Cold War was in the tens of millions (Bourne 2010). 
While many Cold War stocks became available 25 years ago, they may still be 
circulating due to their long shelf life. For example, ammunition recently documented by the 
Small Arms Survey in Syria was found to have been produced as early as 1952 (Jenzen-
Jones 2014). Even older stocks still exist, for example, in Afghanistan: U.S. troops found 
stockpiles of WWII rifles manufactured in 1940 that, although old and outdated, were still 
being used effectively by snipers (Chivers 2011).  Phythian also notes that "the end of the 
Afghan war left a reservoir of unwanted arms which has had the impact of transforming 
northwest Pakistan into a regional center for arms trading" (Phythian 2000, 8).    
Croatia is one of the states that has been known to have large government stocks of 
surplus SALW. It has been alleged that at least 75 planeloads of weapons have been sent 
from Zagreb to Syria since 2012.124 According to a Croatian newspaper, Saudi Arabia 
financed the transaction, while the U.S., Turkey and Jordan all played a role in facilitating 
the transfer to Syrian rebels. This example illustrates that "the global trade in surplus SALW 
draws largely from state stocks rather than the fragmented stocks in civilian hands, or the 
illicit arms of insurgent forces" (Bourne 2010, 68). It also highlights how states typically 
utilize the same sources and networks as private dealers when directing covert military aid. 
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Surplus Arms and Counter-Proliferation Measures 
The second process that affects the availability of surplus arms involves a variety of non-
proliferation efforts such as disarmament, stockpile management, buy-back programs, and 
even, rarely, arms destruction. The effectiveness of these programs has a direct impact on 
the number of surplus arms available. Large-scale international endeavors around these 
issues began only in the 1990s and are typically implemented in post-conflict situations, 
especially civil wars (Bourne et al. 2012).  “Effective stockpile management often requires 
the disposal of surplus arms and ammunition often created by military downsizing after 
conflict.” (Bourne et al. 2012, 194) As we shall see, however, ‘disposal’ only sometimes 
means destruction, and more frequently means transferring to government ownership or 
selling to foreign customers. 
The term disarmament is most commonly used in reference to non-proliferation of 
nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, since the 1990s there has been increasing attention on 
“disarmament, demobilization and reintegration” or DDR, which focuses on individual 
fighters and small arms in post-conflict situations. The intention behind post-conflict 
disarmament is to reduce the likelihood that armed conflict will re-ignite in the same area 
before tensions have cooled. Disarmament has not historically been a priority in post--
conflict reconstruction, but the lack of it can create region-wide instability (Dhanapala et al. 
1999). DDR has important implications for entire regions because when disarmament does 
not occur, militants sell surplus weapons on the black market, potentially feeding the next 
conflict. Many of the small arms accessed in the early days of the Syrian war came from 
neighboring states that have recently experienced civil strife, such as Iraq and Lebanon. 
Since 2001 there has been much progress in addressing SALW control and DDR in 
many regions, but very few initiatives have had complete success. In Afghanistan the UN 
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backed a DDR program from 2003 to 2005, demobilizing and reintegrating 53,000 militants. 
International donors, led by Japan put up $100 million for the project. Yet most of the arms 
captured in the program were transferred back to the Afghan National Army (Bourne et al. 
2012). Similarly, since the wars in Bosnia and Kosovo the entire Balkans region is awash 
with small arms to be sold on legal or black markets, despite many being rounded up and 
destroyed. Almost 150,000 weapons have been collected, but an estimated 750,000 illegal 
guns remain on the loose.125 
The challenges of post-conflict disarmament are multi-layered. Ideally DDR programs 
allow for the voluntary exchange of weapons for cash, goods or training, but it is often 
difficult to persuade individuals that the exchange is worth it. “Some former fighters see 
weapons as a source of power and protection and are therefore hesitant to give them up” 
(Stohl et al. 2007, 55). The more unstable the political situation, the less likely it is for them 
to give up their only tool for self-defense. Where there are sectarian tensions in the political 
sphere weapons may be seen as a political tool or protection against a state they don’t trust. 
Still another aspect that makes the success of buyback programs questionable is the 
tendency of people to use the cash received to buy a new weapon, or to buy guns on the 
black market and exchange them for a higher price in cash (Stohl et al. 2007). 
Nevertheless, when DDR programs are implemented they should be seen as small 
victories and supported widely to have the maximum impact. Because there is no established 
fund at the international level to assist post-conflict areas with disarmament issues, much of 
the funding has come from donor governments and therefore with national priorities. The 
largest weapons destruction program has been funded by the United States, but not in a post-
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conflict country. “The US Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement funded/conducted 
the destruction of 1.4 million small arms, 80,000 tonnes of munitions...and almost 32,000 
MANPADS in over 30 countries” (Bourne et al. 2012, 195). While a significant 
achievement by any standard, most of that was related not to post-conflict zones, but to the 
NATO Partnership for Peace, which targets former Warsaw Pact countries who experienced 
large arsenal buildups during the Cold War.  
The U.S. also made a large effort to recapture hundreds of stinger missiles given to the 
Afghan mujahideen during their war against the Soviets. The CIA spent twice the original 
value of the stingers trying to buy them back (although they still left hundreds unaccounted 
for) (Phythian 2000). The above examples illustrate that the priority for developed nations is 
the control of more visible weapons of mass destruction, not the conventional small arms 
that kill a larger number of people overall. “During the Cold War, SALW and associated 
armed violence issues were marginalised in international policies and arms control efforts, 
which focused instead on WMD and major conventional arms that were considered to be of 
much greater strategic concern” (Bourne et al. 2012, 183). On the one hand, international 
agencies and NGOs have since worked to increase awareness of SALW proliferation. On the 
other hand, governments that would potentially be the biggest donors for these programs 
still set an agenda that prioritizes their own national interests.  
Shoulder-fired missiles, or MANPADS, have received a special kind of attention from 
Western states as they have the capacity to hit commercial airliners from the ground and be 
used as an instrument of terrorism. For this reason, their diffusion is seen as more dangerous 
than that of, say, anti-tank missiles. Most anti-aircraft missiles are stored in secure 
government depots and only last a couple of decades at most, not half a century or more. For 
missiles, a special non-proliferation technology has been developed called a ‘controllable 
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enabler’, which would require a code to be entered to operate normally. “Stolen missiles that 
had not been enabled -- presumably the majority of a country’s holdings -- would be of little 
use” (Stohl et al. 2007, 97).  
On the other hand, many states either promote or turn a blind eye to spread of SALW. 
Why is one form of proliferation seen as detrimental and dangerous, while the other is seen 
as humanitarian intervention? The victims of conventional small arms in the conflicts of 
developing nations are largely invisible to the international community and cause a 
disconnect between perceptions of aid and the impact of arms proliferation. 
At the same time that the UN Security Council was cooperating to remove chemical 
weapons from Syria, several of its members were sending or considering sending shiploads 
of conventional weapons into the country. This two-track policy towards arms proliferation, 
can be seen through the example of Libya.  
 
Libya 
When Gaddafi lost power in 2011, his arsenal of weapons that had been compiled during 
the previous 40 years was abandoned and left open to looters in the chaos of the war (Stohl 
2012). This is currently having a huge impact on arms transfers throughout northern Africa, 
but there has been a specific connection to Syria as noted in Chapter Two. Large shipments 
of small arms have been leaving Libya for Syria since 2012. Whether the U.S. was aware of 
or facilitating these shipments is unknown, but "The U.S. effort in Benghazi was at its heart 
a CIA operation, according to officials briefed on the intelligence."126 According to the Wall 
Street Journal, at least part of the mission in Benghazi was related to the “spread of weapons 
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and militant influences throughout the region, including in Mali, Somalia and Syria” (WSJ 
2012). 
This is only one side of the story, however. In November 2011, the U.S. Department of 
State announced that it had “committed to providing $40 million dollars to assist Libya’s 
efforts to secure and recover its weapons stockpiles."127 There was no mention of small arms 
in this announcement; instead the main concern was the estimated 20,000 MANPADs that 
Gaddafi had accumulated that were now unsecured. Only $1.5 million of the 40 was 
allocated to “two nongovernmental organizations, the Mines Advisory Group and the Swiss 
Foundation for Mine Action, to recruit and train local explosive ordnance disposal teams 
across Libya.”128 Thus, this funding commitment was primarily an issue of counter-
terrorism, not overall disarmament.  
A picture emerges that places the U.S. government at the center of two contradictory 
efforts in Libya: to control the spread of shoulder-fired missiles, and to facilitate or at least 
allow the spread of other small arms to countries like Syria. Scott Stewart of the Stratfor 
intelligence firm goes so far as to claim that, "One of the functions of the U.S. presence in 
Benghazi, Libya, was to help facilitate the flow of Libyan arms to Syrian rebels" (Stewart 
2013). Either way, this reinforces both the duplexity of the approach to contain visible and 
non-visible weapons, and the challenge of securing state stockpiles in turbulent situations. 
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Iraq 
The situation Iraq is a slightly different story, but one that illuminates the stockpile 
security problem further. It shows a cycle of disarmament and rearmament, repeating itself 
indefinitely.  Weapons were accumulated during the Cold War era, but the inflow has 
continued more recently as the world’s largest arms exporters keep supporting the new 
government with new weapons while trying in vain to contain the spread of ‘old weapons’. 
When Saddam’s regime collapsed in 2003 and the Baathist army was disbanded, U.S. 
troops were unable to adequately secure the many stockpiles and armories, leading to a large 
increase in arms available on the black market. “The easy availability and frequent misuse of 
weapons fueled violence, insecurity and fear in Iraq” and within a few months U.S. forces 
tried implementing a gun collection program (Stohl et al. 2007, 30). By offering cash 
payments and amnesty for weapons, as many as 160,000 tons of munitions were collected 
and 240,000 destroyed, but even this achievement “did little to reduce the actual number of 
small arms in Iraq or to improve security on a large scale” (Stohl et al. 2007, 31). 
Meanwhile, as early as 2004, larger conventional weapons, aircraft and light weapons 
began pouring into Iraq from dozens of sources. From 2004 to 2014, the value of 
conventional weapons imported to Iraq totaled around $4 billion.129 More than half of the 
equipment was from the U.S., but other large exporters included Germany, Russia and 
Ukraine. The light weapons included in those orders were thousands of anti-tank missiles, 
several hundred portable SAM missiles and hundreds of mortars.130 It was also revealed in 
an Amnesty International report that the U.S. Department of Defense had “directly funded 
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the transfer of at least 800,000 Soviet-type weapons and 9mm pistols from several 
countries” (Amnesty International 2008, 42). Of those, at least 99,000 kilograms of arms, 
mostly Kalashnikov rifles, were subcontracted to be sent from Bosnia to Iraq between 2004 
and 2005.  
The next crisis came in June 2014 with the advance of the Islamic State of Iraq and the 
Levant (ISIL) into Mosul and Tikrit, and the subsequent fleeing of Iraqi troops who left 
behind “enormous quantities of American-donated armored vehicles, weapons, ammunition, 
and other military supplies.”131 According to a Kurdish chancellor, by August of that year 
ISIL had “five divisions' worth of Iraqi military weapons, all of them US-supplied, that they 
are using to turn on communities that are outgunned, and increasingly outmanned.”132 The 
UN, too, confirms that most of ISIL’s weaponry comes from supplies seized from the armed 
forces of Iraq.133  
While the U.S.-led coalition of states has since launched a major offensive against ISIL 
and considers it to be a major threat, the fact remains that they are fighting largely against 
weapons produced and sold by their own governments and defense corporations. Yet exports 
to the Iraqi government continue, in order to help the state defend itself against ISIL. In 
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2015 alone the U.S. allocated $1.6 billion in military aid to the country.134 Included in that 
figure are 57,600 M4 carbine rifles and 5,000 Kalishnikovs, to be distributed among the 
military, peshmerga forces and tribal security groups.135 Germany and Turkey have also 
promised millions in new aid including missiles, rocket launchers and rifles.136 137 
There is nothing to suggest that the new government will be better able to secure its 
arsenals in the face of an unstable and unpredictable situation. It is well recognized that 
“..progress on SALW governance will remain highly constrained by the fragile, contested 
and impoverished overall systems for governance that are typical in post-conflict contexts” 
(Bourne et al. 2012, 206). Yet the general practice of arming current geopolitical allies is 
rarely challenged, even as paradoxical efforts to collect and destroy certain weapons are 
being pursued. 
The impact of these sales and military aid do not only have implications for Iraq, but for 
the entire region, including Syria. The gains that ISIL made in Iraq strengthened the 
organization in Syria as well and further divided the opposition between those targeting the 
regime and those targeting ISIL. U.S. efforts to train and arm thousands of rebels in the next 
three years have little hope of unifying opposition groups, many of whom still do not see 
ISIL as the main enemy. 
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The dual problems of overproduction and unsecured surplus weapons go hand in hand. 
Arming governments and non-state militants in unpredictable situations is sure to lead to 
more conflict and instability, which inevitably feeds into justifications for providing more 
weapons to whichever actors are deemed to be in need of defensive support. This practice of 
training and arming allies was perfected by the U.S. and Soviet Union during the Cold War, 
but is increasingly being practiced by non-Western states in a more regional context, as seen 
by Qatar and Saudi Arabia in Syria. The difference is that when things went wrong in Latin 
America or Africa, the world’s superpowers were able to walk away and claim no 
responsibility. Today in Syria it’s a different picture. Most of the governments contributing 
to chaos in Syria will undoubtedly be shaped by the outcome for years into the future. 
Efforts to control weapons once they have been distributed in a conflict zone are not 
likely to work, and arms producers will rely on that fact to continue selling their wares to 
those who are threatened by the cycle of uncertainty. Disarmament can be effective, but only 
if pursued on a larger scale and accompanied by a campaign to restrain growth of the 
defense industry. Until the concept of militarization as foreign policy is no longer accepted 
as legitimate, there is little hope for curbing the overall trend of militarism. 
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Conclusion 
The practice of arming militant groups against enemies in proxy wars is not new. Dozens 
of conflicts during the Cold War could easily fit into this pattern. But there was a brief 
period, when these actions came to light, that they were condemned by the international 
community. The norm of non-intervention was upheld by the International Court of Justice 
when it ruled in 1984 that the U.S. had violated that norm by arming and financing the 
contra rebels in Nicaragua. "The Court concluded that the USA had violated the customary 
international law rule on non‐intervention through its ‘training, arming, equipping, financing 
and supplying the contra forces or otherwise encouraging, supporting and aiding military 
and paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua”(Clapham 2014, 3). 
Since that time, however, the transfer of weapons to armed groups in intrastate conflict 
has been typically framed as military ‘aid’ and humanitarian intervention, and the legality of 
such actions is rarely addressed. The cause is not that international laws and norms have 
changed drastically since that ruling. “Simply put, no justification for providing arms to the 
Syrian rebels is likely to survive objective legal examination” (Schmitt 2014, 159). Without 
a Security Council resolution, even humanitarian intervention is an insupportable 
justification for the use of force.  
The Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) norm makes the legality issue cloudier, and helps 
promote the idea that flooding a country with weapons is a form of defensive protection, as 
if there were no other possible response to conflict. RtoP was formulated in 2005 in a 
resolution passed by the General Assembly.138 It transformed the language of humanitarian 
intervention into language of responsibility, which de-emphasized the violation of 
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sovereignty (Falk 2012). However, the RtoP norm is still confined within the legal 
framework of the UN charter and cannot be upheld without a Security Council resolution. In 
the case of Libya, “it was the resolution itself, not any purported legal justification 
associated with the responsibility to protect, which provided the legal ground for mounting 
the operations to protect the civilian population” (Schmitt 2014, 151). Even more clearly, 
the International Court of Justice’s Nicaragua ruling stated that “the protection of human 
rights, a strictly humanitarian objective, cannot be compatible . . . with the training, arming 
and equipping of the contras” (ICJ 1986, 134). 
We are faced with a system, however, where international law is not enforced 
impartially or ubiquitously. Many have further argued that international law requires a 
certain flexibility, pointing to the failure of the international community to prevent atrocities 
such as the genocide in Rwanda. This leads to the distinction between legality and 
legitimacy. While aiding the Syrian rebels against their government may still be considered 
a violation of the non-intervention norm, it is clearly not seen as illegitimate by the 
international actors who have taken part or supported the aid. 
When is it considered legitimate for a state to intervene by aiding military operations 
against another government, and when would such an action be considered aggressive? The 
former is more easily claimed when the rightful authority of a government is in question, as 
has been the case in most of the Arab Spring uprisings. The invasion of Afghanistan, too, 
relied on the refusal of the international community to recognize the Taliban as the 
legitimate government of the country (Falk 2012). However, most states have fallen short of 
recognizing the Syrian opposition as the de facto government of Syria (Schmitt 2014). 
Falk describes legitimacy as a “principled” source of authority needed to address the 
deficiency of international law and further clarifies that “..the violation of an underlying 
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norm of international law carries with it the responsibility to adhere to a framework of 
secondary norms” (Falk 2012, 7). The Kosovo War in 1999 was the first time the legitimacy 
distinction was clearly used to argue against adherence to international law and was based 
on the fairly certain ethnic cleansing that would have occurred without intervention.   
Relying on that kind of justification to bypass Security Council approval is surely not 
appropriate for every situation, however. It is easy to argue for a principle, but the principle 
of protecting civilians may not match up to the end result of intervention, especially when 
taking into account long-term consequences of militarization. Schmitt offers this caution: 
“States should be very cautious about using legitimacy as a justification for violating 
international law; to accept legitimacy as trumping legality is to risk admitting an exception 
that swallows the rules” (Schmitt 2014, 159).  
Increasingly, transnational weapons transfers, whether licit or illicit, are occurring 
without significant public discussion. How is legitimacy to be determined in this case? Falk 
writes that “legitimacy is more properly associated with the domain of civil society broadly 
conceived to include public morality…” (Falk 2012, 15). But this assumes that civil society 
is present and engaged and aware of all the facts of the case. He also writes that silence from 
the international community when legal rationale is questionable is “precedent setting” and 
expresses an “implicit legitimacy claim” (Falk 2012, 23). Yet isn’t the purpose of law in part 
to prevent manipulation of public opinion through public relations rhetoric and half-truths?  
Today, if a decision to arm militant groups is discussed at all in the public sphere, it is 
done so as a matter of national politics, strategy, and vague humanitarian rhetoric, not in 
terms of international law, and not presenting an objective picture. The moral and legal 
dimensions of the debate are absent and it is practically taken for granted that military aid 
will indeed aid the “victims” against the “enemy”. The complexities of arms distribution, 
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control and proliferation are not taken into account. Neither is the broader context of the 
situation including the very real possibility that contributing more arms to a civil conflict 
will lead to protracted fighting, inter-rebel combat, sectarian tensions and greater instability. 
In essence, shortsighted geopolitical interests are put before regional stability and genuine 
humanitarian concerns.  
Silence is not enough to give legitimacy to the covert militarized meddling that 
constitutes the predominant international response to the Syrian conflict. “Before it arms 
Syrian rebels, the United States needs to be comfortable with the prospect of contributing to 
the crystallization of a customary norm allowing other states to arm rebel groups in similar 
circumstances before it proceeds” (Schmitt 2014, 159). In fact, though, that point has 
already been surpassed. Other states are actively arming rebel groups in Syria, and the only 
ones objecting are the few geo-political allies of Assad, making the issue politically 
polarizing.  
The shortcomings of global peacemaking reflect an ongoing need to strengthen the 
independence of multilateral forums and their capacities to resolve crises with diplomacy 
rather than force, and provide adequate humanitarian rather than military aid. 
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